

Book-Tax Conformity: Implications for Multinational Firms

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Abstract

This paper examines the implications for multinational firms of recent proposals to conform tax and financial reporting (i.e., book-tax conformity). Proponents of book-tax conformity argue that the current dual system in the U.S. allows firms to simultaneously manage their taxable income down while managing their book income upward. By requiring book-tax conformity, they contend that firms will be forced to trade-off reporting high earnings numbers to shareholders and reporting low earnings to the taxing authority, resulting in improved financial reporting and less tax avoidance. Reduced compliance costs and easier auditing have also been cited as potential benefits of book-tax conformity.

However, before one can evaluate the costs and benefits of book-tax conformity it is necessary to understand international implications of conformity, particularly regarding the foreign operations of U.S. multinationals. We describe several possible approaches to implementing book-tax conformity for firms that have both domestic and foreign operations. We discuss issues likely to arise with each approach and conjecture at the behavioral responses to each. Using firm-level financial data from Compustat, we simulate the effects of book-tax conformity on publicly traded U.S. firms. Specifically, we simulate the effects of book-tax conformity on the level and variability book earnings and tax payments / collections.

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1. INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the implications for multinational firms of recent proposals to conform tax and financial reporting (i.e., book-tax conformity). Proponents of book-tax conformity argue that the current dual system in the U.S. allows firms to simultaneously manage their taxable income down while managing their book income upward. By requiring book-tax conformity, they argue that firms will be forced to trade-off their desire to report high earnings numbers to shareholders and the desire to report low earnings to the taxing authority, resulting in improved financial reporting and less tax avoidance. Reduced compliance costs and easier auditing from having a single set of books have also been cited as potential benefits of book-tax conformity.

Aspects of book-tax conformity that have not been examined, however, include how the accounting for operations of U.S. multinationals would be affected. We describe several possible approaches to implementing book-tax conformity for firms that have both domestic and foreign operations. These approaches include: 1) book-tax conformity while retaining worldwide taxation but with no deferral of foreign income, 2) book-tax conformity while retaining both worldwide taxation and deferral of foreign income, 3) book-tax conformity along with territorial taxation, and 4) book-tax conformity with formulary apportionment. We discuss issues with implementing each system and conjecture at the behavioral responses to each. In addition, we discuss the possibility of combining any of these approaches with International Accounting Standards/International Financial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS) and the possibility of partial moves toward conforming book and taxable income.

Using financial statement data for the publicly traded U.S. firms, we simulate the tax consequences of book-tax conformity for the first and third approach. Specifically, we simulate the effects of book-tax conformity on the mean and variance of tax payments / collections and book earnings. We are not able to simulate the other approaches in the same manner due to data limitations. However, we attempt to provide a rough estimate of the aggregate effect on tax revenues for option 2 (retaining deferral) using aggregate data on reinvested earnings from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We also describe in broad strokes what formulary apportionment would look like if implemented.

As with the current system of taxation, many complications emerge when one begins considering how to actually apply a new tax system to multinationals. The goal of the paper is not to spell out all of the details necessary to implement such a system, but rather to give a sense of how book-tax conformity would play out in terms of the numbers both in aggregate and at the firm level, to describe the stress points in implementation that would require additional rules, and to conjecture where behavioral responses could be expected.

We believe that such a study fills a hole in the literature, as book-tax conformity has emerged in policy circles as a potential means to improve efficiency and curb the perceived ability of firms to “have their cake and eat it too.” For example in Professor Mihir Desai’s testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee he states, “More ambitiously, if corporations simply paid taxes on reported GAAP income, significant compliance costs would be nearly eliminated, the top marginal corporate tax rate could be reduced significantly to 15% without a loss of revenue, and actions designed to exploit differences between these two reporting systems would be eliminated.”¹

¹ Statement of Mihir Desai, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the House Committee on Ways and Means. May 9, 2006.

In addition, the recent Tax Reform Panel established by President Bush considered a proposal to tax large entities based on their net income reported on financial statements. The Tax Reform Panel ultimately did not include book-tax conformity in its set of proposals and instead called for additional research to better understand the consequences of adopting book-tax conformity. The objective of this paper is to provide such research, at least in terms the international effects of book-tax conformity.

There is limited prior research on the implications of book-tax conformity. Most of the prior research is focused on opportunistic reporting, compliance savings, and U.S. capital market costs. For example, Guenther, Maydew and Nutter (1997) examine the impact of book-tax conformity on firms' financial reporting and tax planning activities using a small set of publicly traded firms required to increase conformity after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86). Overall, Guenther et al. (1997) conclude that increasing the extent of book-tax conformity causes firms to defer financial statement income. Other studies including Hanlon, LaPlante and Shevlin (2005), Hanlon and Shevlin (2005), and Hanlon, Maydew and Shevlin (2006) examine the potential loss of information when firms are required to increase their level of conformity. The evidence suggests that if conformity were increased there would be a loss of information from earnings to the capital markets, thus illustrating one cost to book-tax conformity.

On the other hand, Desai (2005) argues that because the U.S. system of dual reporting allows (indeed, requires) different computations of income for book and tax purposes, the quality of earnings reported to both the capital markets and tax authorities is reduced by opportunistic behavior by managers. In other words, because managers attempt to maximize financial accounting income and minimize taxable income and are 'unconstrained' by the rules in the other system (i.e.,

the tax and book rules are not conformed) they can act opportunistically thereby reporting lower income to the tax authorities and also misleading shareholders.²

Although the U.S. has not implemented an overall regime that closely links the two income measures, and thus large sample evidence of a regime change is unavailable using U.S. data, several international studies have examined these issues. Ali and Hwang (2000) examine the relation between measures of information content of financial accounting data and several country specific factors. Ali and Hwang (2000) find that the information content of earnings is lower when tax rules significantly influence financial accounting measurements.³

Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) also find that valuation in code-oriented countries (i.e., where tax and book incomes are very closely linked) is much less related to reported earnings. Similarly, Guenther and Young (2000) report evidence consistent with accounting earnings in the U.K. and the U.S. being more closely related to underlying economic activity than accounting earnings in France and Germany, where greater conformity is required.^{4,5}

To date, however, no one has studied the international tax implications of the US moving to a conformed system of taxation. Because multinational firms account for a substantial fraction of

² Note, however, that even under the U.S.'s current system of unconformed incomes firms may voluntarily conform when committing financial accounting fraud. For example, Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2004) report evidence consistent with firms accused of reporting fraudulent financial accounting earnings simultaneously overstating taxable income and thus, paying taxes on the overstated income. These results provide one scenario that calls into question the validity of the argument that conforming book and taxable incomes will increase the quality of financial reporting or taxable earnings.

³ This result is consistent with tax laws being influenced by political, social, and economic objectives rather than the information needs of investors. This evidence would lead to the prediction that if book and tax incomes are conformed in the U.S., there would be a loss of value-relevant information in the capital markets. See also, Harris, Lang, and Moller (1994) which examines the value relevance of German accounting measures over a period in which the German accounting rules included a closer link between book and taxable incomes and a greater emphasis on both detailed prescriptive regulations and the needs of debtholders.

⁴ In another study, Young and Guenther (2003) use the degree of book-tax conformity as one of two proxies for the informativeness of financial accounting in a country (low book-tax conformity, higher informativeness) and test whether capital flows into a country are decreasing with increased book-tax conformity. Their results are consistent with this prediction. Thus, another cost of book-tax conformity documented by Young and Guenther (2003) is decreased capital mobility.

⁵ See also, Desai, Dyck and Zingales, 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006a,b; and McClelland and Mills, 2006.

total economic activity, the implications of book-tax conformity for these firms in terms of tax planning and reporting, the accounting for income taxes, and the reporting of income under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or IAS/IFRS is of great importance. We note that in our analysis, we assume that only the U.S. changes to a book-tax conformed system (not any other countries), thus much of the effect of conformity is on domestic income. However, what we discuss and show are some of the complications and issues that arise for U.S. multinational firms with respect to their foreign earnings. Thus, conformity may not be as much of a simplification as some proponents may suggest.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of how current U.S. Federal taxation differs from U.S. GAAP and describes how taxes, in particular book-tax differences, are reflected in firms' financial statements. Section 3 describes several possible approaches to applying book-tax conformity to firms that have both domestic and foreign operations. Section 4 simulates the effects of book-tax conformity on U.S. multinationals using firm-level financial data from Compustat. In this section, we examine the effects of book-tax conformity on the mean and variance of tax collections and on financial accounting earnings. Section 5 briefly discusses the experience of other countries. Section 6 concludes.

2. *DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HOW THE TAX CODE AND GAAP MEASURE INCOME AND HOW THOSE DIFFERENCES ARE REFLECTED IN THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS*

Although the tax code requires large corporations to use the accrual method, accrual accounting for tax purposes is not necessarily the same as accrual accounting for GAAP purposes. For example, similar to the financial accounting rules, when a firm makes a sale and receives an account receivable in exchange, income is recognized for tax purposes even though no cash has

been exchanged. Likewise, if the firm incurs an expense and does not pay in cash but instead generates an account payable, the amount can still be expensed for tax purposes. However, many differences between accrual accounting for tax purposes and GAAP exist. For example, depreciation is recorded differently for tax purposes, generally following the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System, which for many assets results in depreciation at an accelerated pace relative to the straight-line depreciation taken for financial accounting purposes.⁶ In addition, there are fewer depreciation methods allowable for tax purposes compared to book-purposes.

Some other accruals are simply not allowed. For example, the estimates used to record the expense for the warranty expense and bad debt reserve generally are not allowed for income tax purposes. Thus, before expensing an amount for warranty costs the firm must actually pay these costs (the customer must return the product for warranty service and the seller must perform the service) before the expense can be deducted. Similarly, bad debts cannot be estimated but rather are only deductible once the debt has actually gone bad (thus, the company is on the specific write-off method for tax purposes).

In terms of international aspects, the tax code operates significantly differently than the rules for GAAP. How these differences play out in the financial statements is summarized in Figure 1 and described in more detail below. Under the current U.S. tax system, U.S. resident companies are subject to current U.S. tax on their worldwide income.⁷ However, no U.S. tax is owed on the earnings of a foreign subsidiary until those earnings are distributed to the U.S. parent in the form of

⁶ Also, immediate expensing to some degree is allowed under IRC §179 and under the recent bonus depreciation rules put in place after September 11, 2001.

⁷ Under a worldwide system such as that employed in the U.S., the U.S. taxes the worldwide income of its permanent residents and domestic corporations and uses foreign tax credits to mitigate double taxation of the earnings (we discuss the foreign tax credit further below). This is in contrast to a territorial tax system in which a country taxes only income that was earned within its borders. It is important to note that under the U.S. worldwide system, U.S. corporations are taxed on their worldwide income. However, foreign corporations are taxed only on the income they earn in the U.S. (thus, effectively a territorial system for foreign corporations).

a dividend.⁸ The postponement of U.S. taxes until the time of repatriation is commonly referred to as ‘deferral.’ The deferral concept in tax is an important distinction from financial accounting. Deferral arises because for tax purposes, the consolidation rules are different for domestic and foreign subsidiaries. For tax purposes, consolidation onto a single return can be elected, but is not required, when ownership, direct or indirect, of a *domestic* subsidiary is at least 80 percent in terms of voting power and value. Foreign subsidiaries generally cannot be included in the domestic tax consolidation.⁹ Thus, the financial statements will include the income or loss of foreign subsidiaries that are more than 50 percent owned and the representative share of income or loss of foreign entities owned between 20 and 50 percent while the tax return will not include any of these amounts. Instead the tax return will include any dividends received from these entities while the financial statements will not include these dividend amounts.¹⁰

There are other differences between tax and financial consolidations. In contrast to consolidations in financial accounting, there is no deduction allowed for minority interests in tax consolidations. Financial accounting consolidations include 1) the income of domestic subsidiaries owned more than 50 percent but less than 80 percent, and 2) the parent’s share of the income or loss from foreign subsidiaries owned from between 20 and 50 percent. The tax consolidation will not include these amounts unless such income has been distributed to the parent company in the form of a dividend or included as Subpart F income.

In sum, differences between tax and GAAP consolidation can lead to book-tax differences with regards to income from foreign (and domestic) affiliates. If the entity is greater than 50

⁸ There are exceptions (e.g., Subpart F income rules) that will be discussed below.

⁹ If the foreign subsidiary had income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business then that income would be subject to U.S. tax, however the foreign subsidiary still would not be part of the tax consolidation with the U.S. parent.

¹⁰ Another difference between tax and book consolidations is that intercompany transactions are eliminated for book purposes while they are deferred for tax purposes and the accompanying investment basis adjustment rules mimic the equity method of financial reporting.

percent owned by the U.S. parent the earnings will be part of U.S. worldwide income for financial accounting purposes. However, if the income from the foreign subsidiary is deferred for tax purposes (i.e., not repatriated back to the U.S. and made subject to tax currently) then a book-tax difference will result because book income will include the foreign subsidiary's income and taxable income will not. Because of the significant tax advantages potentially afforded under the deferral rules, a series of anti-abuse rules have been enacted to prevent U.S. taxpayers from deferring U.S. tax on certain classes of income, such as passive income that could easily be shifted to a tax haven. These anti-abuse rules are contained in subpart F of the IRC. Essentially, these rules act to restrict the benefits of deferral to the active business income of a foreign subsidiary and as a result, lessen the book-tax difference attributable to the deferral rules in the current U.S. tax system.

Another provision of the tax code that becomes important in the discussion of international book-tax differences is the allowance of tax credits against a firm's U.S. tax liability for foreign taxes paid or accrued. While the tax credits themselves are not book-tax differences, a firm's tax planning in the international arena is often directed toward maximizing the amount of foreign tax credit it can use to offset its U.S. tax liability, all else constant. Because firms have engaged in strategies to shift income to and between foreign sources to maximize the available credit, additional rules have been written in the tax code to 1) prevent the credit from offsetting U.S. tax on domestic-source income and 2) to provide guidance on how to allocate income and expenses between domestic and foreign sources. The tax strategies employed by firms can generate additional book-tax differences and thus, a discussion of the foreign tax credit rules is necessary here.

Foreign tax credits are allowed to mitigate the double taxation that would occur when foreign-sourced income is earned by a U.S. company because the income would be taxed in both

the foreign country in which it was earned and in the U.S., where the company is incorporated. The U.S. also has foreign tax credit limitation rules which, in general terms, limit the foreign tax credit to the U.S. tax rate times the foreign source income. Thus, the foreign tax credit after limitation is the minimum of 1) the sum of direct and indirect foreign taxes paid and 2) the foreign tax credit limitation (i.e., U.S. tax rate times the foreign source income).

An important consideration for the foreign tax credit limitation is, of course, the delineation of what is foreign source and domestic source income, How are these measures derived for tax purposes and how do they compare to the domestic pre-tax book income and foreign pre-tax book income reported for financial accounting purposes? For tax purposes, IRC §§ 861-865 deal with the allocation of worldwide income to U.S. source versus foreign source. These rules provide definitions for income from sources within the U.S. (§861 – e.g., what types of interest income, dividend income, personal services income, rentals and royalties, gains and losses from real property or inventory, and others) and without the U.S. (§862 – e.g., generally interest income, personal services income and dividends not classified as from the U.S. in §861, rentals and gains and losses from real property located outside of the U.S., and others).

There are also special rules (under §§863-865, and the regulations thereunder) for determining the source of income for items not listed in §§861 and 862. For example, §863(b) provides the sales-source rules that allow a company that exports self-produced goods to elect to include a portion of its gross profits from exports in foreign-sourced income, which benefits companies in an excess foreign tax credit position by increasing their allowable foreign tax credit limitation. IRC §864 provides, among other things, rules for allocating interest expense. In general, interest expense incurred in the U.S. is allocated between U.S. and foreign income on the basis of the value of the taxpayer's assets (book or market) that generate U.S.-source and foreign-

source income.¹¹ Interest expense allocated to foreign-source income reduces the foreign tax credit limitation by reducing the amount of foreign source income for foreign tax credit purposes.¹²

Research and experimentation expenditures conducted in the U.S. (if not conducted to meet legal requirements imposed by a political entity) are allocated 50 percent or 25 percent to U.S. sourced income, with the remaining amounts not exclusively allocated apportioned at the annual election of the taxpayer on the basis of gross sales or gross income.

It is important to recognize that these rules affecting the source of income for foreign tax credit computation purposes affect the tax liability through their effect on the foreign tax credit limitation, but they do not alter the amount of taxable income reported on the U.S. tax return under the current system of worldwide taxation. Because the U.S. parent is subject to tax on its worldwide income (with an exception for unrepatriated income of foreign subsidiaries) even taxable income allocated to a foreign source is taxed on the parent's tax return.

In sum, taxable income will differ from book income because of different accrual rules and different consolidation rules. Where the income of a firm is earned or where the assets are located is of lesser importance for financial accounting purposes as the consolidation rules in financial accounting do not distinguish between domestic and foreign subsidiaries. This is very different from the tax code, in which the source of income matters because of the different taxing jurisdictions and the goal of mitigating double taxation across these jurisdictions through the use of a foreign tax credit. We next discuss how book-tax differences are reported for financial

¹¹ Under Jobs Act §401 and revised IRC §864, taxpayers may make a one-time election to allocate and apportion third-party interest expense of U.S. members of a worldwide affiliated group to foreign-source income for foreign tax credit purposes in an amount equal to the excess, if any, of: 1) the worldwide affiliated group's interest expense multiplied by its worldwide assets, over 2) third party interest expense incurred by foreign members of the group that would otherwise be allocated to foreign sources (Merrill, et al., 2006).

¹² Note that the foreign tax credit limitation is as follows: $\frac{FSI}{WWI} \times \text{U.S. tax on worldwide income}$ or more simply FSI

* the U.S. tax rate, where FSI is foreign-sourced income and WWI is worldwide income.

accounting purposes and how some of the above events/transactions affect a firm's effective tax rate and total income.

The rules for the accounting for income taxes are found in Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109 (SFAS 109).¹³ While a detailed discussion of these rules is beyond the scope of this paper, we outline the basic principles with special attention given to international effects. When we review the various alternatives for achieving book-tax conformity we will discuss how each alternative would alter the reporting of the tax expense and tax assets and liabilities for financial reporting purposes.

Under SFAS 109 firms record a current tax expense or benefit and a deferred tax expense or benefit (both in total and by jurisdiction (domestic or foreign)). The sum of these two total amounts is the total tax expense or benefit. This total tax expense divided by the firm's total (worldwide) pre-tax income is the firm's (worldwide) effective tax rate (ETR). The current tax expense should approximate (with some exceptions discussed below) the taxes on the firm's current year taxable income.¹⁴ The deferred tax expense includes 1) the amount of taxes payable in the future (or if negative, the tax effects of future deductions) generated by transactions in the current year and 2) the tax effects of reversals of previously established deferred tax assets and liabilities.¹⁵

A multinational corporation must generally compute deferred tax assets and liabilities for all temporary differences that exist between the book and tax bases of its worldwide assets and liabilities. A notable exception is Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 23 (APB 23), which provides that deferred taxes that would be due on repatriation should not be recognized for

¹³ We note that FASB Interpretation Number 48 (FIN 48), an interpretation of FAS 109, was released during June 2006. All of our discussion and data are pre-FIN 48 implementation.

¹⁴ In general, we mean the taxable income of the entities included in the firm's 10-k, however, there are some exceptions which we discuss below.

¹⁵ See Hanlon (2003) for further discussion on firm disclosures and what can be inferred from financial statements about a firm's taxable income and tax payments.

undistributed earnings of subsidiaries if the indefinite reversal exception applies.¹⁶ Thus, if a firm has foreign earnings in a foreign subsidiary that it deems permanently reinvested, the firm's tax provision will not include an accrual of U.S. taxes that would be due on repatriation of those earnings. As a result, if the foreign tax rate is different than the U.S. tax rate, total taxes will be different than taxes at the U.S. statutory rate. The difference will be listed in the firm's rate reconciliation (which reconciles the firm's expected tax on reported worldwide financial accounting earnings, using the U.S. statutory tax rate, and the actual total tax provision). The label is generally something like 'foreign income taxed at lower rates than U.S. statutory rate.' We next turn to a discussion of how such a system could be implemented and changes necessary relative to the current rules discussed above.

3. *IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES TO BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY IN AN INTERNATIONAL SETTING*

It is important to consider the manner in which conformity would be accomplished. The often heard refrain "the devil is in the details" is particularly appropriate here. In this section we consider how book-tax conformity could be implemented in the context of taxing multinational firms. We describe four different approaches to implementing book tax conformity. These approaches include: 1) book-tax conformity while retaining worldwide taxation but with no deferral of foreign income, 2) book-tax conformity while retaining both worldwide taxation and deferral of foreign income, 3) book-tax conformity along with territorial taxation, and 4) book-tax conformity with formulary apportionment. Finally we discuss 1) the implications of book-tax conformity using any of these approaches coupled with adoption of IAS/IFRS, 2) potential areas for partial conformity, and 3) some areas where transition rules would be particularly important.

¹⁶ SFAS 109 retains the indefinite reversal exception to deferred tax accounting.

3.1 CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL OF THE POSSIBLE APPROACHES

3.1.1 Who will determine the rules and how will firms respond?

With each of the approaches to book-tax conformity, an over-arching question is whether taxable income would be conformed to financial accounting income or whether financial accounting income would be conformed to taxable income. Even this question is likely not as simple as it seems. Most proposals and conjectures would call for the use of financial accounting income to compute taxable income (i.e. taxable income would conform to GAAP). If the FASB were retained as the primary standard setter of GAAP, this would effectively put the FASB in charge of writing the tax laws for entities that would be subject to book-tax conformity. Under this scenario, presumably the Congress would still determine the tax rates, but the tax base in terms of business income would be determined by the FASB.¹⁷

Would Congress be able to resist the temptation to interfere with the FASB its new role? Hanlon and Shevlin (2005) argue that in practice the eventual result would be for Congress to begin tinkering with GAAP for the same fiscal and social policy reasons that it cites now when it amends the current tax code. The end result could be a GAAP that looks much like the current tax code. Indeed, as economist Milton Friedman observed, the end result of base broadening is just a renewed opportunity for lawmakers to sell old tax preferences (Thorndike, 2006). To be sustainable and withstand interference, Congress would likely require some say into who is appointed to the FASB; currently the government plays no role in their selection.

Even in the absence of Congressional interference in GAAP, it is likely that firms' motivations to reduce their tax payments would cause them to alter their accounting choices, even while staying within GAAP, to achieve better tax treatment as in Guenther et al. (1997). We label

¹⁷ In addition, the current set of tax treaties that the U.S. is party to would need to be re-examined and perhaps renegotiated.

management's altering (lowering) of their financial reporting to reduce tax payments as the behavioral response to book-tax conformity.

In our simulations, we assume that taxable income will be conformed to book income as it is currently reported. Thus, our simulations assume the current accounting standards will be used to determine the one income measure that is reported to both shareholders and the tax authorities and that there will be no behavioral response by firm management.

3.1.2 What entities will be subject to book-tax conformity?

Another over-arching question is what entities would be subject to book-tax conformity. Would all corporations be subject to book-tax conformity, only corporations over a certain size threshold, or only publicly traded corporations? Would large partnerships and S corporations be subject to book-tax conformity? What about sole proprietorships? If book-tax conformity was not applicable to all businesses, then the tax code would need to be retained for the companies to which it would not apply. On the other hand, if book-tax conformity did apply to all companies, the GAAP rules would need to be applied by all the companies for which it is currently not required (e.g., non-public entities).

3.1.3 What about losses?

In addition, all methods of book-tax conformity would have to confront the issue of losses. Under GAAP, if a firm has negative income for a period it simply reports negative income. Losses are not carried back or forward under GAAP. The tax code, in contrast, allows for net operating loss (NOL) carrybacks and carryovers so that firms can offset income and losses. Under current law, NOLs can be carried back two years and forward up to twenty years. Without the opportunity for NOL carrybacks and carryovers, asymmetric taxation can result in which firms pay taxes in

years they have positive income but get no tax relief from years in which they have negative income. Firms in cyclical industries would face heavier tax burdens over their life than would firms in stable industries. To avoid this result, it seems likely that NOL rules would need to be appended to GAAP for tax purposes. To preserve the informational role of financial statements, the effects of NOL carrybacks and carryovers on the income statement would need to be confined to their effects on tax expense, so that pre-tax income would reflect that of the current period. Accordingly, our simulations allow for NOLs based on GAAP pre-tax income. To keep the simulations manageable we allow for losses to be carried forward indefinitely and we do not allow losses to be carried back.

3.1.4 How to deal with transactions that currently qualify for non-recognition?

Finally, an issue with all of the approaches is whether to preserve any of the current non-recognition provisions in the tax code, which are not currently in GAAP, and if not, how to make sure reliance on GAAP does not open up massive opportunities for tax avoidance. For example, the current tax code allows for certain transactions to be non-taxable, or more properly viewed as tax-deferred. Common examples include acquisitions and divestitures under Section 368, like-kind exchanges under Section 1031, and corporate formations under Section 351. Under these provisions the gain in the transaction is deferred for tax purposes, but the basis is not stepped up except to the extent that gain is recognized.

For example, suppose that firm A acquires all of the stock of firm B in exchange for A stock in a transaction that qualifies for non-recognition under Section 368. Neither firm B nor the shareholders in firm B will recognize any taxable income in the transaction itself. However, firm B's assets will keep the same tax basis that they had immediately before the transaction; the tax bases will not be stepped up to fair market value. This preserves the potential for future corporate level taxation of the gains built in to B's assets. Moreover, former shareholders of B who now hold

A stock instead will take the same tax basis in A stock that they used to have in their B stock (i.e., a substituted basis). This preserves the potential for future investor level taxation of the gains that B shareholders had in their B stock.

The closest analogy in GAAP to the non-recognition rules in the tax code was pooling of interests accounting, which is no longer allowable. In a pooling transaction, an acquirer would purchase a target firm in a stock-for-stock exchange. The assets of the target firm would then be reflected on the balance sheet of the acquirer not at their fair market value, but at the same book values they had previously had on the target's balance sheet. In contrast, purchase accounting, the only method currently permissible under GAAP for business combinations, results in the target's assets and liabilities being recorded at fair market value on the balance sheet of the acquirer. Often this results in the recording of goodwill and other intangible assets to the extent the purchase price exceeds the fair market value of the tangible assets less liabilities.¹⁸

With purchase accounting as the only option for business combinations under GAAP, strict adherence to book-tax conformity would seem to eliminate the ability to acquire businesses via tax deferred methods. Selling shareholders and corporations would have to recognize gains and losses for tax purposes for the difference between their tax basis and the fair market value of the consideration received even in pure stock-for-stock acquisitions. To the extent capital allocation is improved by allowing acquisitions that defer taxation, there could be an efficiency loss associated with strict adoption of purchase accounting for tax purposes. On the other hand, if purchase accounting was retained for GAAP but exceptions were made to allow for different methods for tax purposes that would lead to the return of book-tax differences following acquisitions and would undercut many of the perceived benefits of book-tax conformity. Since our simulations are based

¹⁸ See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141 "Business Combinations" and Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 "Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets."

on the financial statements of publicly traded companies, the numbers will include the effects of purchase accounting acquisitions and thus implicitly allow tax depreciation for basis step-ups on which no tax was paid.

3.2 *WORLDWIDE TAXATION WITH BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY: NO DEFERRAL OF FOREIGN INCOME*

3.2.1 *Implementation*

The first and most straightforward option (at least on its face) is to simply adopt GAAP as the basis of taxation in its entirety. Because GAAP counts income when it is earned regardless of whether it is earned in the U.S. or abroad, this would maintain the current worldwide system of taxation but without the deferral of foreign income of foreign subsidiaries. It is important to note in this analysis that because there would be no deferral of foreign earnings, the U.S. taxation of the earnings of foreign subsidiaries would be accelerated. Thus, this first approach will have a different (broader) tax base both because of the elimination of book-tax differences and the elimination of deferral (because deferral is a book-tax difference in some sense). However, this type of a system would allow foreign losses, if they exist, to offset domestic income, which is currently not allowable. For publicly traded firms this approach would be equivalent to taking the total worldwide pre-tax income from the firm's 10-K and using that as taxable income.

If we desire to retain a system in which we allow tax credits to mitigate the effect of double taxation, we would continue to allow for a foreign tax credit against the U.S. tax. If we retain a foreign tax credit we would need to either retain income and expense sourcing rules similar to those currently in IRC §§ 861-865 either as a separate system outside of GAAP or require FASB to include these rules within GAAP. A foreign tax credit under this approach to implementing book-tax conformity would be somewhat indirect because unless the financial accounting rules are the

same worldwide *and* book-tax conformity is implemented worldwide (i.e., all countries used the same rules for both accounting and tax purposes) it is likely that the income included on the U.S. financial statement for the foreign subsidiaries would be different than the income reported for foreign tax purposes in the foreign jurisdiction. Thus, the credit system would be imperfect at offsetting double taxation year-to-year in the sense that it would not give a credit for foreign taxes paid or deemed paid on the exact dollar of earnings reported in the U.S. in the same period it is reported in the foreign jurisdiction. The reason is that that the income could be recognized in the U.S. before or after it is included in taxable income in the foreign tax jurisdiction. However, over the life of the firm theoretically a foreign tax credit system should accomplish the goal of mitigating double taxation.

The role of SFAS 109 (accounting for income taxes) in the financial statements would be reduced but not eliminated in this system. In particular, there would be no deferred taxes on domestic income, except for deferred tax assets for net operating loss carryforwards and foreign tax credit carryforwards. There still could be deferred taxes related to foreign income to the extent that temporary differences exist between the tax bases under foreign tax purposes and the basis under GAAP. There would of course be no permanent differences related to domestic income (e.g., no muni-bond interest exemption) and no foreign tax rate differential due to deferral (although a firm could have additional taxes in foreign jurisdictions if not currently creditable). An effective tax rate reconciliation would likely still be necessary to show the effects of the additional state and local (and foreign if applicable) taxes as well as the effects of credits.

3.2.2 Predictions and behavioral response

In this section we make predictions regarding the outcome of implementing book-tax conformity in the manner outlined above. Later in the paper, where possible, we evaluate these

predictions through simulations using firm level financial data. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the data in the simulations are from the current system of taxation and financial reporting, and thus do not take into account any behavioral response on the part of firms to a system of book-tax conformity. Thus, the simulations are not so much tests of hypotheses as they are calculations designed to shed light into some of the likely effects of book-tax conformity. We do, however, discuss how we think firms will change their behavior when faced with book-tax conformity.

We predict that book-tax conformity based on worldwide income with no deferral would broaden the tax base relative to the current system of taxation. There are three reasons for this prediction. First, as stated above, ending deferral would likely increase the tax base. Second, is that the incentives of managers are to report a higher book income to shareholders and lower taxable income to the taxing authorities and these incentives will be reflected in the data (i.e., financial accounting earnings will be higher because of managerial incentives). Third, GAAP has over time moved gradually from being based on historical cost accounting to being increasingly based on estimated fair market value.¹⁹ If the market value of firm's net assets (assets less liabilities) is increasing, then an accounting system based on market values will, on average, produce higher earnings than historical cost accounting. However, we note that there is also an alternative property of financial accounting that works in the opposite direction. Financial accounting rules are conservative (expenses are generally recognized before gains) and income tax rules are not (future expenses cannot be estimated and deducted currently). This conservatism will work against the base being broadened.

¹⁹ This shift has occurred piecemeal some assets and liabilities on the balance sheet are reflected at historical cost while others are recorded at market value. Because earnings arise from changes in assets and liabilities, the methods used to record assets and liabilities can affect earnings.

We have three other predictions assuming a revenue-neutral implementation of book-tax conformity. That is, we assume that Congress would adjust the corporate tax rate such that aggregate tax collections would be the same as under the current system over the period we examine.²⁰ Our second prediction is that, on average, firms will report higher after-tax GAAP earnings under book-tax conformity than under the current system of taxation (assuming no behavioral response). This prediction may seem strange given that pre-tax earnings are unaffected by conformity and with revenue neutrality we force the total tax collections to be the same with and without conformity. So how could after-tax earnings increase? The key is that current taxes represent only a portion of GAAP tax expense. Firms also record deferred tax expense or benefit in their GAAP financial statements to account for temporary differences between tax and book bases. On average, firms record deferred tax expenses. Under book-tax conformity, much of those deferred tax expenses (i.e., those relating to domestic taxes) would no longer be recorded.

Our third prediction concerns the variability of tax collection under book-tax conformity. The concept at work here is that earnings represent the sum of cash flows and accruals. Prior research shows that changes in cash flows and changes in accruals are negatively correlated; that is on average, accrual earnings are much smoother than cash flows. Therefore, if the tax system was replaced with one based on GAAP earnings that include more accruals, we would expect that the tax base would exhibit less variation over time.

Our fourth prediction relates to the cross-sectional variability of after-tax GAAP income. Prior research has shown considerable variation in long-run effective tax rates across firms and industries (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2006)). Under strict book-tax conformity, effective tax rates would be expected to cluster around the statutory tax rate (they would not necessarily

²⁰ Thus we estimate the taxes paid by our sample firms in aggregate over the entire period of the study and then set the new tax rate such that the same tax is collected from the new (conformed) tax base. In any given year tax collections under the conformed system could be greater or less than under the current system.

equal the statutory rate because of the effects of NOLs, foreign taxes, etc.). With pre-tax earnings unaffected by conformity, decreased cross-sectional variation in effective tax rates should lead to less cross-sectional variation in after-tax earnings.

As mentioned above, the behavioral response common to all methods of book-tax conformity is that if financial accounting were used as the base for the measurement of taxable income, firms would have incentives to reduce the amount of income reported for financial reporting. Thus, while we predict that book-tax conformity would broaden the base using the data available to us, our estimates of how much broader the base would be (if at all) are overstated because firms would likely begin reporting lower income for financial accounting purposes thus reducing the base relative to what our estimates will show (for empirical evidence on this issue see Guenther et al. (1997)).²¹

In addition, as with the current tax system, a behavioral response could arise under the conformed system because, even though worldwide income would be currently taxable by the U.S., there would be incentives to shift income across jurisdictions in order to maximize the foreign tax credit (assuming all countries did not adopt the same system). This is much like the incentive that firms currently have under the tax law. In other words, more foreign source income for U.S. tax purposes that does not actually trigger foreign taxes (because of differencing source of income rules between the U.S. and the foreign jurisdiction) will increase the foreign tax credit limitation and thereby allow more foreign taxes to be creditable if the firm faces a binding foreign tax credit limitation. If the U.S. corporate tax rate was reduced as a result of base broadening under book-tax conformity, more firms would face binding foreign tax credit limitations, which would accentuate this type of behavioral response. Thus, although worldwide income would be taxed in the U.S.

²¹ For papers that examine the capital market effects of this type of behavioral response see Hanlon and Shevlin (2005) and Hanlon, Maydew and Shevlin (2006).

under this system income shifting would still be attractive to maximize the foreign tax credit. There would, of course, be cross-sectional variation in how attractive the income shifting would be under such a system based on the amount of base broadening for the firm and whether the firm had a binding foreign tax credit limitation.²²

3.3 *WORLDWIDE TAXATION WITH BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY: ALLOWING FOR DEFERRAL OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY INCOME*

3.3.1 *Implementation*

A second manner in which book-tax conformity could be implemented would be to conform U.S. taxable income to U.S. GAAP but to continue allow for deferral of taxation on foreign earnings until they are repatriated as dividends to the U.S. parent company. This would mean there could be timing differences between when foreign subsidiary income would be recognized for GAAP and tax purposes. Thus, foreign income would not be included in U.S. taxable income and the current foreign tax credit system would operate as it does under the current system. Here we will assume that this system would be implemented by not allowing foreign subsidiaries into the U.S. tax consolidation. This would produce a different consolidated group for GAAP and tax purposes even though there would otherwise be book-tax conformity. That is, foreign entities would only be subject to U.S. tax on their U.S. source earnings and would use GAAP to determine those earnings. The foreign income of foreign subsidiaries would not be subject to U.S. taxation

²² Thus, as stated above, the importance of the identity of the source of income would either require additional rules in GAAP to specify where income is earned or a separate system of rules outside of GAAP (e.g., a mini-tax code). Currently GAAP does not have detailed rules to determine the source of income.

until repatriated to a U.S. shareholder (e.g., U.S. parent). When the income was repatriated, its amount would be determined under GAAP.²³

Accounting for income taxes would still be necessary under this system. In particular, book-tax differences and thus deferred taxes could still arise with regards to income of foreign subsidiaries to the extent GAAP differed from foreign tax law. The APB 23 rule of not providing deferred taxes for the U.S. tax consequence of foreign earnings that are permanently reinvested abroad would still be applicable if current GAAP is maintained. The line in the effective tax rate reconciliation for differences between the U.S. tax rate and earnings taxed at foreign rates would continue to exist for many firms.

3.3.2 Predictions and behavioral response

Relative to the current system of taxation, our predictions under this approach are in the same direction as the first approach. That is, relative to the current system we expect that moving to book-tax conformity on a worldwide basis with no deferral would: 1) broaden the tax base (but less so than option 1 above), 2) result in greater after-tax GAAP income due to removal of some deferred taxes (again assuming no behavioral responses), 3) result in less variation over time in aggregate tax collections, and 4) lead to less cross-sectional variation in effective tax rates.

Predictions 2, 3 and 4 assume a revenue-neutral implementation. Unfortunately we lack micro data on reinvested foreign earnings and thus are unable to test these predictions. We do, however, provide some evidence in the simulations section of the paper of the effects of deferral on the tax base using aggregate data on reinvested foreign earnings. This is useful because as discussed above shifting from the current system to worldwide conformity with no deferral of foreign income turns

²³ There would likely need to be a gross-up provision to account for indirect foreign tax credits, as currently exists in the tax law. In addition, there would likely be a demand for rules to prevent deferral of passive income, similar to the Subpart F rules in the current tax law.

two “dials” at once: conformity and eliminating deferral of foreign income. The second approach turns only one dial relative to the current system: conformity.

In terms of the behavioral response, similar to the first approach to conformity discussed above, the second approach would place greater pressure than currently exists for GAAP to have rules to determine where income is earned. As in the current system and in the first approach, firms would have an incentive to shift income for U.S. foreign tax credit purposes to create more foreign source income to increase the foreign tax credit limitation. In addition, firms could also have incentives to make sure their foreign source income is reported in foreign subsidiaries and not in domestic subsidiaries to keep the income out of the domestic consolidation and defer U.S. tax on the foreign income (similar to incentives in the current system). Transfer pricing between domestic and foreign subsidiaries could be a strategy employed. GAAP would need to be enhanced to specify rules for transfer pricing. Transfer pricing incentives issues are mitigated under current GAAP to some extent by consolidating entities under common control, regardless of whether they are domestic or foreign, and then eliminating intercompany transactions (e.g., no income is reported in the consolidated financial statements under GAAP if subsidiary A sells something to subsidiary B). If foreign subsidiaries were not consolidated for tax purposes, then even though their taxable income was otherwise determined using GAAP rules, that would give rise to incentives to manage transfer pricing to reduce the overall tax burden of the larger group of controlled entities.²⁴

²⁴ Note that with deferral, rules similar to the current Subpart F rules would need to be retained. Also, note here the difference between the first approach to conformity and this second approach. Under the first approach even though all foreign subsidiaries would be consolidated, income shifting may still be attractive to mitigate the foreign tax credit limitations. Under the second approach, income shifting is attractive to both shift income out of U.S. taxable income because foreign subsidiaries are not consolidated and to mitigate foreign tax credit limitations.

3.4 *TERRITORIAL TAXATION WITH BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY*

3.4.1 *Implementation*

The third option for book-tax conformity would be to adopt it in conjunction with a territorial tax system. Recall that territorial taxation would generally be consistent with the proposals in President Bush's Tax Reform Panel. Under this type of system, the conformity would then be that U.S. taxes would be based on U.S. domestic source financial accounting income but foreign source earnings would not be taxed by the U.S. Accordingly, foreign source losses could not be used to offset domestic income.

A move to territorial taxation based on GAAP would require additional rules in GAAP to determine the source of income, similar to the approaches above. Indeed, the territorial option would likely place the most strain on these rules because foreign sourced earnings would never be taxed in the U.S. Shifting income to low tax jurisdictions would permanently reduce the aggregate tax burden of the group. Under this approach, GAAP would have a consolidated group consisting of the same entities as the tax consolidated group. However, only domestic source income from the entities would be included for tax purposes whereas worldwide income would be included for GAAP, creating a permanent book-tax difference for foreign sourced income.

In terms of accounting for income taxes, under a territorial book-tax conformed system there would be no deferred taxes on domestic income because tax and book income would be perfectly conformed at the domestic level (except again for deferred taxes resulting from net operating losses and any related valuation allowance). Deferred taxes could still arise with respect to foreign income to the extent there were temporary differences between local GAAP and foreign tax rules. As stated above, there would be a permanent difference for the tax effects of the foreign sourced earnings never taxed in the U.S. (netting to the difference between the U.S. tax rate and foreign tax rates).

3.4.2 Predictions and behavioral response

Relative to the current system of taxation, we cannot predict ex ante what the effects of book-tax conformity with territorial taxation would be in terms of the tax base or firms' after-tax incomes. While moving to conformity should broaden the tax base, moving to territorial taxation should reduce the tax base. Although we do not predict the net effects of this approach, we can and do provide empirical evidence of what such a system would look like. Specifically, in section 4 we use micro data from publicly traded firms to simulate book-tax conformity with territorial taxation.

In terms of the behavioral response, several studies have examined the effects of moving to a territorial tax system (see Merrill et al. (2006) and Altshuler and Grubert (2001) as examples). We do not re-examine this issue here except as it might interact with book-tax conformity. While many studies on the effects of territorial taxation conclude that there would likely not be an increase in foreign investment at the expense of domestic investment, income shifting using transfer pricing or other non-real investment methods (especially for passive type income) would likely be an issue. For the purposes of our examination of using GAAP as the basis for tax, the concern is that GAAP currently has very minimal rules regarding the source of income whereas territorial taxation places a lot of emphasis on the source of income. This discrepancy would need to be resolved either through much more rigorous rules added to GAAP or the maintenance of a tax code to supplement GAAP with these rules.

3.5 WORLDWIDE BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY COMBINED WITH THE USE OF A FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT SYSTEM

3.5.1 Implementation

This approach would combine book-tax conformity using worldwide income with the method that U.S. states use to apportion income among them. Instead of attempting to determine

the source of income, a firm's income would be apportioned among jurisdictions based on a formula. The traditional formula used by states apportions income based on property, payroll and sales. For example, suppose firm A was being taxed by State Z and had 10% of its sales in State Z, 30% of its property and State Z and 50% of its payroll in State Z. Assuming State Z's apportionment formula equal-weighted each of the factors, then 30% of firm A's income would be taxable by State Z $[(10\% + 30\% + 50\%) / 3]$.²⁵ An advantage of formulary apportionment is that one does not need to try to figure out where income is sourced. In that sense formulary apportionment would go well with taxation based on GAAP income because determining the location where income is earned is not a major emphasis of the rules in GAAP. Moreover, the ability to shift income into low tax jurisdictions is mitigated under formulary apportionment because to shift income to the low tax jurisdiction the firm would have to shift factors, property, payroll and/or sales to the low tax jurisdiction.

Complications still arise with formulary apportionment, to be sure. For example, with formulary apportionment one does need to determine where to count sales for purposes of the sales factor. There can also be complications with where payroll and property are located, as employees have been known to travel and some property is mobile, but arguably these complications are less cumbersome than those that arise with attempting to source income.

3.5.2 Predictions and behavioral response

Relative to the current system of taxation we do not venture predictions on what effects of formulary apportionment coupled with book-tax conformity would have on the tax base or on firms'

²⁵ U.S. states can use different weightings. Over time, tax competition among the states has caused many states to weight the sales factor more heavily than the property and payroll factors, to reduce the tax burden on in-state producers and increase the tax burden on out of state producers (see Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000 and Anand and Sansing, 2000). In particular, many states double weight the sales factor and some states base apportionment solely on the sales factor.

after-tax earnings. In terms of empirical evidence we are also limited by the fact that firms' financial statements typically do not include the distribution of property, payroll and sales across domestic and foreign sources. Therefore we are unable to use micro data from the financial statements to simulate the effects of this approach.

In prior literature, Shackelford and Slemrod (1998) estimate the revenue consequences of using formulary apportionment for 46 U.S. multinational firms from 1989-1993. They use data from financial statements to obtain an estimate of taxable income and the asset and sales factors from geographic segment data. In addition, they obtain an estimate of the payroll factor by industry from the 1989 Bureau of Economic Analysis Benchmark Survey. They estimate that, ignoring behavioral responses, shifting to an equal-weighted, three-factor formula would have increased these 46 firms' U.S. tax liabilities by 38%, with an 81% increase for oil and gas firms. They find that the firms report a lower percentage of their worldwide profits as U.S. profits than their share of assets, sales, or payroll. The segment data used by Shackelford and Slemrod (1998) is generally not widely available post 1997 (after the implementation of SFAS 131) and thus we cannot conduct a firm-level analysis using more recent data.

To shed light on the behavioral response to book-tax conformity coupled with formulary apportionment, one can look how firms respond at the state level. Some types of state level tax planning involve transactions with subsidiaries that are not taxable in a particular state due to issues of nexus. For a firm to be taxable by a particular state it must have sufficient contact with the state, i.e., nexus. Thus, sometimes firms can reduce their state tax burden by simply avoiding nexus with certain states or causing only certain of its subsidiaries to have nexus with a given state. We expect nexus to be less of an issue at the Federal level, especially when coupled with book-tax conformity which would consolidate entities that are under common control. It would be hard for a large

multinational to avoid nexus with the entire U.S. and because its controlled entities would be consolidated for both book and tax purposes, this would mitigate the ability to avoid taxes by shifting income across entities.

3.6 OTHER ITEMS

3.6.1 Book-tax conformity using International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)

Another possibility for implementing book-tax conformity would be if all or many countries on the adoption of IFRS also adopted book-tax conformity. This creates a variation of each of the prior four options where instead of book income being defined by U.S. GAAP book income (and thus the tax base) would be defined by IFRS. The main advantage of coupling book-tax conformity to international accounting standards would be having one set of accounting rules for both book and tax purposes and for all countries that so adopted.

An advantage to having multiple countries using the same rules is that the foreign tax credit would more accurately mitigate double taxation on a year-to-year basis. For example, assume Company X reports \$200 of earnings under IFRS. Further assume that \$140 is designated as domestic source income and \$60 is designated as foreign source income. This foreign source income was earned \$40 in France and \$20 in Ireland. Now if the U.S. taxes total worldwide income then \$200 will be taxable in the U.S. whether repatriated or not. Because all countries would be on IFRS and have a conformed book-tax system (again assuming no country specific adjustments in the conformity process) and assuming the sourcing of income rules were the same, the company's taxable income in France would be \$40 and their taxable income in Ireland would be \$20. As a result, the U.S. could allow for foreign tax credits on taxes paid on foreign sourced earnings that would align annually between the foreign sourced income taxed in the U.S. and abroad.

Of course the main hurdle with such a program would be obtaining buy-in from the various countries, similar to issues the EU faces with a number of decisions. Small low-tax countries (i.e., tax havens) in particular may be reluctant to endorse such a system if they perceive that they are the beneficiaries of the current system of taxation.

3.6.2 *Partial conformity*

While many of the proposals are about conformity in general, we recognize that partial conformity would be a more likely policy option. The challenge with this option, however, is deciding which book-tax differences to eliminate. One item that seems to pose little harm in terms of both information loss to investors or revenue to the government would be the elimination of the uniform capitalization rules in IRC Section 263(A). If Section 263(A) were eliminated for tax purposes and inventory costing done for both book and tax purposes as firms currently cost their inventory for book purposes there likely would be 1) no change in the information set available to investors, 2) a decrease in compliance cost, and 3) little lost in terms of revenue.²⁶

Hanlon and Shevlin (2005) briefly discuss the partial conformity option as well. They propose eliminating the book-tax difference for depreciation by conforming to the accelerated depreciation method currently used for tax purposes. This would eliminate one of the largest book-tax differences (See Poterba et al. (2006) where the deferred tax liability for property, plant and equipment is by far the largest deferred tax item on the balance sheet for their sample of firms). In addition, it would result in minimal information loss to investors, if any, and retain the investment incentives put in place by Congress.

Other potential items where the book and tax treatments could be conformed include those such as debt-equity hybrid securities and synthetic leases which seemingly allow companies the best

²⁶ We thank Peter Merrill for suggesting this item in particular.

treatment for both tax (debt treatment) and financial reporting purposes (equity treatment) with little information gain for shareholders and potential revenue loss to the government. Similarly, any special interest provision in the tax code could be eliminated in a move to conformity creating a much simpler Code and fewer book-tax differences. The impediment to this proposal, of course, is the loss in political power of Congress to provide incentives or disincentives for certain behaviors (and general vote garnering).

There are many other potential book-tax differences, but most would involve a trade-off of information for investors and revenue and control for the government. For example, items such as the allowance for doubtful accounts could be conformed. If conformed to the tax method of allowing only specific write-offs, investors will not receive information from managers regarding the proportion of the current receivables that are expected to be uncollectible. However, if tax were to conform to the financial accounting method of estimating the amount to expense, the government would suffer a revenue loss and be subject to deductions based on management expectations, which would be more difficult to verify and audit (Hanlon and Shevlin, 2005).

3.6.3 *Transition rules*

Such a large-scale policy and reporting change would require an extensive set of transition rules. For example, if a firm had recorded depreciation differently for book and tax on a previously purchased asset and the rules were changed so that strict book-tax conformity was required, firms would be allowed double deductions for depreciation if accelerated depreciation were allowed for tax purposes prior to the change and then the remaining book basis were depreciated following the rule change. Some transition rule would be necessary to prevent tax deductions for the same basis twice. Another example pertains to accruals made for financial reporting prior to the tax deduction

(e.g., OPEB costs, warranty reserve). In this case some transition rule would need to be considered for firms to obtain the deduction for tax purposes. Consideration of how these transition rules would work specifically is beyond the scope of this paper but would be important should conformity be enacted.

4. ESTIMATED ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY

In this section, we estimate the effects of book-tax conformity for those approaches where we have sufficient data to permit reasonable estimation. We use firm level financial statement data for publicly traded firms. These data are sufficiently detailed to allow us to simulate book-tax conformity under the first approach above, which would adopt book-tax conformity on worldwide income with no deferral of foreign income, and the third approach, which would adopt book-tax conformity in conjunction with territorial taxation. We do not have micro data on reinvested foreign earnings and thus cannot perform the same kinds of simulations for the second approach, book-tax conformity on worldwide income with deferral of foreign reinvested earnings. However, we do present some macro data relevant for that approach.

As part of the estimations, we simulate the new U.S. tax rate that would be required to make the book and tax conformed system revenue neutral. We also compute the volatility of the tax revenue stream under the current and conformed systems and the effects on after-tax book income. We do not attempt to simulate the behavioral effects of the adoption of book-tax conformity in general or the efficiency effects of resulting lower marginal tax rates.

4.1 DATA LIMITATIONS

There are, of course, data limitations in computing these estimates. The first issues arise in the computation of book income. Under the current U.S. financial accounting rules, the income

statement of the firm will show revenues and expenses and then the net of these before tax expense is called pre-tax book income. The next expense shown on the income statement is the income tax expense (both current and deferred) related to the pre-tax book income from continuing operations. Below this pre-tax book income number are several items reported net of tax (both current and deferred) – cumulative effect of an accounting change, extraordinary items, and discontinued operations. In our analysis, we make no adjustments for these net of tax items. We are not advocating that these items be tax exempt in a book-tax conformed system. However, due to data limitations, attempting to adjust for net of tax items could distort our analysis more than it would improve it. For example, we do not know the gross amount of income or expense for these items. Only the amount net of tax is reported in Compustat and the amount of tax is not disclosed separately. We could gross all of these items up by the statutory tax rate to estimate the gross amount of the income and expense but this would introduce measurement error into our computation of book income.

Perhaps even more problematic with trying to adjust for the net of tax items is that to compute revenue neutrality we assume that the firm's U.S. current tax expense is the amount of U.S. taxes actually owed or paid on the current year's income (we discuss the problems and benefits of this assumption below). Because the tax expense line on the firm's financial statement includes only taxes on pre-tax book income, this number will not include the taxes on the extraordinary items, the discontinued operations, or the cumulative effect of accounting changes. Thus, if we adjusted income for the net of tax items, our benchmark measure -- current tax expense -- would be understated to the extent our firms had current taxes on these items and overstated to the extent our sample firms reduced their current tax liability with losses generated by these items. As a result, we would not be making a valid comparison (or computation of a revenue neutral rate). In addition, we

do not know the extent to which the taxes on these items are current or deferred or even which portion is U.S. or foreign so trying to adjust the current tax expense to be comparable with any income adjustment we could make would be nearly impossible. Thus, we opt to leave the income (loss) from the cumulative effect of an accounting changes, extraordinary items, and discontinued operations out of our pre-tax book income number. Based on descriptive data in our sample, only 8.7% of the sample has non-zero or non-missing amounts for any of these three items and the average of the three amounts is only -1.3% of pre-tax book income.

Another set of issues that arise in the computation of book income stem from how ownership of other firms is reported under GAAP and thus on Compustat. Many of the ownership/consolidation rules are discussed above and we discuss here how these specifically affect our computation of book income for our aggregate calculations. Most importantly is the potential for double counting of income. There are many cases where the same income is reported and filed on two separate 10-Ks (and is included in Compustat twice as a result). To the extent we can we try to eliminate this double counting. We discuss each case in turn below.

First, is the case where one company owns greater than 80% of another company and the remaining shares (or company debt) of the owned company are publicly traded. For discussion purposes, let's use General Motors (GM) and General Motors Acceptance Corp. (GMAC) as an example. GM owns 100 percent of GMAC during our sample period. Because GM's ownership of GMAC is greater than 50% the firms are required to file consolidated financial statements with the SEC. These consolidated statements will include all the income, assets, and liabilities of GMAC and the other entities greater than 50% owned by GM with an appropriate subtraction for portions not owned by GM (i.e., minority interests). In addition, because GMAC has publicly traded debt,

GMAC is also required to file its own financial statements with the SEC.²⁷ As a result, when we pull pre-tax book income from Compustat we will be double counting the income of GMAC. To eliminate this double counting, we eliminate all firms from our sample with a stock ownership code in Compustat (STK) that indicates it is a subsidiary of another publicly traded company (STK=1).²⁸ As a result in our analyses, we only tax the income of the subsidiary (GMAC in our example) one time and that is in the income of the parent (GM in this case).²⁹

Second, is the case where one company owns between 20% and 50% (inclusive) of another company – for discussion purposes let’s say Company X owns 40% of Company Z. As described above under such conditions Company X records 40% of the net income of Company Z on Company X’s financial statements under the heading “Equity earnings (loss) of affiliates.” As long as Company Z is publicly traded (its equity or debt), it will also file financial statements with the SEC showing 100 percent of its income. There are at least two possible ways such investments could be treated under a book-tax conformed system. We discuss and simulate each of these separately. First, is to subject the equity earnings recorded in Company X’s financial statements to tax under the assumption of strict book-tax conformity (no book-tax differences for Company X).

²⁷ As stated above, for tax purposes in a case such as this (where ownership is greater than 80%) the firms can elect to file a consolidated tax return, which GM and GMAC presumably do, and all of GMAC’s income is included on the tax return. Any tax amount that is different on a consolidated versus a separate company basis is generally handled through intercompany payments. Note that if the ownership were greater than 50% but less than 80% the financial accounting issues would be the same as above but the firms would simply file separate company tax returns. Under this scenario (ownership between 50% and 80%) the tax return of the parent company would include only dividends received from the subsidiary and thus an additional book-tax difference is generated between the dividends received and the parent’s share of the financial accounting income. Under the conformed system this book-tax difference would be eliminated.

²⁸ This is a disclosure code in Compustat and thus probably not 100 percent accurate. For example, we looked up Kraft Foods, which is approximately 85 percent owned by Altria, and it did not have an STK code of 1. However, we looked up several other companies (e.g., GMAC, General Electric’s subsidiaries, and others) and found all of these to have a code of 1. In addition, we believe this code to apply to only subsidiaries more than 50 percent owned. To investigate we looked up DirecTV which is 33.8% owned by News Corporation and it did not have a code indicating it was a subsidiary.

²⁹ We note that because we exclude subsidiaries of publicly traded companies from the sample, there is no adjustment necessary for minority interest because Compustat’s data item #170 will (generally) not have minority interest subtracted from it (Compustat reports this number as a below data #170 item). Thus, 100 percent of the subsidiary’s income remains fully taxed under our computation.

This treatment results in the equity earnings being taxed to X and to Z because Z will be taxed on its full pre-tax book income as well. We take this approach in our main analysis by making no adjustments to the investor's pre-tax book income (Company X in our example).³⁰ The second option is to exempt the equity earnings in affiliates from taxation and continue to tax 100 percent of the Company Z's pre-tax book income as reported on their 10-K. This treatment would be consistent with the concept of not double taxing investment earnings (the approach we take with consolidated subsidiaries). However, doing this creates a (permanent) book-tax difference for Company X. As a result, we do not take this approach in our main analysis (strict book-tax conformity) but rather we implement this adjustment in our secondary analysis below where we add in other book-tax differences to the simulations.³¹

For entities that are owned 20% or less and are classified as trading securities, any changes in market value to the securities are included in the book income of the entity that owns the security under current GAAP rules. We include this mark-to-market income in the book income number we use assuming strict conformity. Note that the actual income (not market value based) of the partially owned company will also be taxed when that firm's own 10-K is subjected to taxation. Conceptually we would back out this mark-to-market income from pre-tax book income in our secondary analysis below to prevent taxation of investment income. However, there is no data item in Compustat that allows us to parse this income item out and as a result we do not adjust for this item. More broadly, how mark-to-market issues will be dealt with in a book-tax conformity system is beyond the scope of this paper.

³⁰ The first treatment where we do not adjust the investor's book income to back out equity earnings in affiliates results in the U.S. taxation of any 20%-50% ownership interests of foreign subsidiaries which would not be taxed in the U.S. system if we make the adjustment (as we do below) to back these earnings out of the investor's income.

³¹ We note that under the current unconformed system equity earnings are not taxed to the parent when recorded for financial accounting purposes but any dividends paid from the investee to the investor are taxable, subject to the dividends received deduction. Under book-tax conformity the dividends would be fully exempt from taxation at the parent level because they are never included in book-income.

4.2 *SAMPLE*

Because we are assuming, at least at first, no book-tax differences at all and no behavioral response on the part of the firms, we use the pre-tax book income number reported on firms' 10-Ks in our main analysis. To conduct our analysis we first pull a sample of firms from Compustat with the requisite data. We start with all U.S. incorporated, non-financial firms on Compustat that are not subsidiaries of another publicly traded firm (STK not equal to 1), and have assets greater than zero, during the years 1995-2004 (10,912 firms and 68,143 firm-years). We then eliminate all observations that are ADRs, LPs, and Trusts, because of the different tax rules for these firms (and thus additional problems with the use of current tax expense disclosures), and we also eliminate observations with CUSIPs ending in "Z" or "Y" to help eliminate double counting of firms that have redundant data in Compustat.

We then delete observations for which we cannot obtain measures of worldwide, U.S., and foreign components of the firm's current tax expense, total tax expense, and pre-tax book income. Finally, we exclude observations that have an interrupted time series of data in Compustat because we cannot compute net operating loss carryforwards over the missing years. For these observations we include the longest continuous string of data available. The final sample consists of 53,477 firm-year observations from 10,185 firms. Sample selection is detailed in Table 1.

4.3 *SIMULATIONS OF WORLDWIDE TAXATION WITH BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY: NO DEFERRAL OF FOREIGN INCOME*

Table 2 presents our simulations under a book-tax conformed system with worldwide taxation and no deferral of foreign income. We perform the simulation under both revenue neutrality and with the current statutory tax rate. For the revenue neutral scenario we compute a

new statutory tax rate that results in the same aggregate tax revenue to the government over the sample period as under the current system. For the current statutory tax rate scenario we hold the statutory rate at 35 percent and apply it to the new, conformed tax base.

Several assumptions go into these estimates. When we compute a rate to keep the system revenue neutral we assume the U.S. current tax expense is the actual tax collected by the U.S. government. We recognize that there are many problems with this assumption (e.g., the tax contingency reserve, the accounting for stock option deductions, etc. (see Hanlon and Shevlin (2002) and Hanlon (2003)) but as a first pass we use it as an empirical estimation basically because of the lack of availability of anything better. For example, we also attempt to use Statistics of Income (SOI) data (untabulated) but because we do not know the exact intersection of Compustat firms and firms included in the SOI data we do not believe these data to be any more reliable than using the current tax expense as an estimation of taxes collected for our sample of firms. Further, we cannot use cash taxes paid from the cash flow statement for our sample firms because this amount will include taxes paid to all jurisdictions, for past years' audit settlements, and current year estimated payments but not the amount, if any, due with the current year's return (although it will include the amount due with the prior year's return).

Thus, we recognize that to the extent current tax expense differs from actual taxes paid this will introduce measurement error in our estimates. However, some of the measurement error will wash out across time and across firms. In addition, the mental exercise of considering the various methods of implementing book-tax conformity and the issues involved with the methods is of at least equal importance to the initial dollar estimates in many ways. If the policy debate moves closer to a book-tax conformed system firms can conduct their own analysis using their actual data and the IRS could conduct its own analysis (possibly using the new M-3 data that will soon be

available that will allow them to better match up book and taxable incomes between the appropriate entities). In addition to this first assumption that current tax expense is a reasonable estimate of taxes paid, we also assume that under book-tax conformity there would be 1) no net operating loss (NOL) carrybacks, 2) indefinite NOL carryforwards, and 3) foreign tax credits subject to similar foreign tax credit limitations under the current system and that these credits can be carried forward indefinitely.³²

We begin with world wide financial accounting pre-tax book income (PTBI shown in the first column of Table 2). We then show the amount of U.S. current tax expense (Compustat data item #63) for the sample as is reported under the current non-conformed system. Next we show current tax expense under the simulated conformed system, first assuming that the 35 percent statutory tax rate applies and then assuming revenue neutrality over the aggregate 10 year period. We do not enforce revenue neutrality on a year-by-year basis because if we did it would result in a statutory tax rate that changes year-to-year. Having a statutory tax rate that floated from year-to-year would likely be unacceptable and introduce many problems.

To arrive at the simulated revenue neutral tax rate, we calculate each firm's U.S. current tax expense under a book-tax conformed system for each year. In making this calculation we first adjust each firm's world-wide pre-tax book income for past losses, assuming no carryback and an indefinite carryforward period. This adjusted world-wide pre-tax book income number is then multiplied by a first pass simulated tax rate which results in the same amount of current tax expense as under the current non-conformed system. Foreign tax credits are then computed as the lesser of foreign pre-tax income times the simulated tax rate or reported foreign current tax expense. The foreign tax credit is then subtracted from the calculated U.S. current tax expense. Foreign tax

³² Note we do not have any other credits in the conformed system. For example, we do not include a research and development credit.

credits are carried forward indefinitely, but are not carried back, to make the simulation more tractable. Because the foreign tax credit (and therefore the simulated current tax expense) depends on the simulated revenue neutral tax rate, we iteratively choose the tax rate until the sum of the simulated current tax expenses (after foreign tax credits) over the years is close to actual current tax expense over those same years.

The right-most three columns of Table 2 show the sample's net income after foreign and U.S. tax as currently reported, under conformity with a 35 percent U.S. tax rate, and under conformity with a revenue-neutral U.S. tax rate. The after-tax book income as currently reported is (PTBI (data #170) – U.S. current and deferred taxes (data items # 63 and # 269) - foreign current and deferred taxes (data items # 64 and #270)). The firm's net income under the conformed system is (PTBI (data #170) – simulated U.S. tax expense – foreign current tax expense (data #64) – foreign deferred tax expense (data # 270)).³³

Note that the new tax rate required is lower than the U.S. statutory rate under the current system: 26.2% versus the current statutory rate of 35%. The lower rate is consistent with the prediction that conformity would result in a broader base of taxation (ignoring any behavioral responses).³⁴ This can be seen by comparing the domestic current tax expense under the current system to what it would be under conformity with the same 35 percent statutory tax rate. For the mean year, aggregate current taxes from our sample would increase from approximately \$80 billion to approximately \$110.9 billion. Tested at the firm level this is significant with a p-value <0.0001.

³³ Note we ignore state and other taxes for simplicity.

³⁴ Note that in our simulations we make no adjustments for stock option deductions. During the time period of our tests, firms were not required to expense stock options for financial accounting purposes under most cases. Following the strict book-tax conformity for which we can do computations, we use book income with no adjustments and thus do not adjust for stock option compensation. We note that the current tax expense amount we use to estimate actual taxes paid is overstated for firms that obtained deductions for stock options and as a result our tax rate estimates are likely overestimated for this time period. We note that the financial accounting rules have since changed to requiring expensing of the estimate of the value of the stock option over the vesting period. If we would do an as if calculation over our sample period based on these new rules it would lower book income and increase the rate required to maintain revenue neutrality.

Holding revenue constant, the results are also consistent with the prediction that conformity would increase the average firm's after-tax GAAP income (the p-value is <0.0001). This result is evident in Table 2 at the aggregate level, where after-tax GAAP income increases from approximately \$176.8 billion per year without conformity to approximately \$212 billion per year with conformity. Again, this result may seem paradoxical at first since current taxes are held constant under the revenue neutrality assumption, but the difference is that under conformity much of firms' deferred tax expenses goes away because of the elimination of domestic book-tax differences. Table 2 indicates that the standard deviation of annual tax collections would decrease from approximately \$15.6 billion to approximately \$12 billion. With only ten annual observations, however, this decrease is not statistically significant, contrary to our third prediction. The data support the prediction that conformity would on average reduce the variation in firms' after-tax GAAP earnings. When tested at the firm level the p-value is <0.0001 .³⁵

In Table 3 we present industry worldwide average effective tax rates, both current effective tax rates (U.S. and foreign current tax expense over pre-tax book income) and total effective tax rates (U.S. and foreign current plus any applicable deferred taxes divided by pre-tax book income). The industry classifications are from Barth et al. (2005). In Panel A of Table 3 we present the data for all firms and in Panel B of Table 3 we present the data including only firms with positive pre-tax book income. Current effective tax rates (total effective tax rates) are calculated by dividing the sum of current tax expense (total tax expense) across time within an industry and dividing by the sum of pre-tax book income.

Note that under the conformed system there are no U.S. deferred taxes (except for NOLs and foreign tax credits) because there are no domestic book-tax differences. However, there are still

³⁵ The capital market effects of the change in volatility and increase in net income should be considered. For a somewhat related study regarding tax rate changes and market implications see Chen and Schoderbek (2000).

foreign deferred taxes because we are not assuming that other countries have changed their systems to one where book and taxable incomes are conformed. Thus, the foreign deferred tax amounts are the same under the conformed and non-conformed systems in our simulation.

On average over the entire sample of firms, when we assume foreign taxes paid do not change and that this policy is revenue neutral in the U.S., there is no overall difference in the current effective tax rates between the conformed and non-conformed systems.³⁶ However, if we look at the total effective tax rate (current plus deferred taxes divided by pre-tax book income) there is a decline on average over the sample: from 41.5% in the non-conformed system to 29.8% under the conformed system. In addition, for both the effective tax rates there are distributional effects meaning that some industries experience a tax increase and some a tax decrease. If we look to Panel B where only firms with positive aggregate earnings are included, we see that a revenue-neutral application of conformity would result in a decline in industry average ETRs from an estimated 32.1% under the current system to 28.8% under conformity. In addition, we see that retail firms, utilities, and services firms would experience the largest declines in effective tax rates indicating that these firms had fewer book-tax differences in the non-conformed system (their base was not broadened much by the new rules).

4.4 *THE EFFECTS OF DEFERRAL OF FOREIGN INCOME*

As discussed earlier, we do not have micro data on firms' decision to reinvest or repatriate foreign earnings and therefore we cannot undertake detailed simulations to estimate how a book-tax conformed system would be affected if an exception was made for reinvested foreign income.

Moreover, even if we knew the amounts of reinvested earnings we would also need to know how

³⁶ Note that the current effective tax rate here is different than the current effective tax rate in Table 2. This difference is because Table 2 does not include foreign taxes in the current tax expense column and Table 3 does include foreign taxes.

much foreign tax had been paid on those earnings to estimate foreign tax credits in the firm-level simulations. We can, however, use aggregate data on reinvested foreign earnings to provide at least some sense of the magnitude of reinvestment. Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Survey of Current Business show that amount of reinvested foreign income across all industries averaged approximately \$65 billion per year during 1995-2004. Unfortunately, to know the effect on U.S. tax revenues we would need to know, at a minimum, how much foreign tax was paid on that income. If the foreign taxes paid on these earnings was, say, 10 percent lower than the U.S. rate that would suggest an effect in the ballpark of \$6.5 billion in terms of annual aggregate U.S. tax collections that would be foregone if deferral were retained in our book-tax conformed system. We caution though that this is a very crude estimate. We note that the question of the tax revenues/burden of deferral is not settled in prior literature.³⁷ The main point that we want to convey is that book-tax conformity in the strict sense (as detailed above in the first approach we take) eliminates deferral and thus broadens the tax base beyond just eliminating domestic book-tax differences. If deferral were retained along with book-tax conformity (i.e., allow a book-tax difference for foreign source earnings of foreign subsidiaries) then the base would likely be smaller and the tax rate necessary to remain revenue neutral would be higher than the rate we estimate above.

4.5 *SIMULATIONS OF BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY COUPLED WITH TERRITORIAL TAXATION*

In Table 4 we combine book-tax conformity with territorial taxation and simulate its effects using firm-level data. This simulation takes advantage of the fact that firms, as part of the tax footnote to their financial statements, report their GAAP pretax domestic income and GAAP pretax

³⁷ See Desai and Hines (2004), Grubert (2005) and Desai and Hines (2005) and the references therein for some statistics, estimates, and debate on the topic.

foreign income. To simulate territorial taxation with book-tax conformity, GAAP pretax domestic income becomes the new tax base. We assume the losses would still be able to be used to offset income in other years and implement this by allowing NOL carryovers. To keep the simulations tractable we do not allow for NOL carrybacks. There is no need for foreign tax credits in this system because in a strict territorial system foreign income would never be subject to U.S. tax.

As with the simulations in Table 2, in Table 4 we report the effects of conformity first assuming the current 35 percent tax rate was applied to the new tax base and then assuming a new revenue neutral tax rate. Recall that we did not make predictions of how book-tax conformity with territorial taxation would compare with the current system, nor did we have expectations of how it would compare with book-tax conformity with worldwide taxation.

Interestingly, the aggregate results of book-tax conformity with territorial taxation appear fairly similar to those obtained with worldwide taxation and no deferral. This may seem surprising at first since territorial taxation by definition exempts foreign income from the U.S. system, whereas worldwide taxation at least potentially subjects foreign income to U.S. tax to the extent that U.S. tax rates exceed foreign tax rates. According to the firm level simulations, little U.S. tax must come from foreign income (i.e., the foreign tax credit must eliminate most of the U.S. tax receipts on foreign sourced earnings).³⁸ If a 35 percent tax rate was applied to domestic income only, Table 4 reveals an estimated \$102 billion in annual aggregate tax collections for our sample firms. The corresponding number in Table 2 for worldwide taxation is approximately \$111 billion per year in aggregate. When we impose revenue neutrality for the sample firms in the study, the simulation produces a tax rate of 27.4 percent under territorial taxation versus 26.2 percent under worldwide taxation. Thus, there does seem appear to be a modest reduction in the tax base under territorial

³⁸ This observation is consistent with statistics available from the IRS's Statistics of Income division. See specifically Figure B in "Statistics of Income Studies of International Income and Taxes available at <http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/articl/0,,id=117514,00.html>.

taxation compared to worldwide taxation. Again, it is important at this point to recall that the simulations assume no behavioral response. With territorial taxation, one might expect the incentives to shift income from the U.S. to low-tax jurisdiction and permanently avoid U.S. taxation be a point of emphasis for anti-abuse rules and in audits.

As was the case under the first approach (book-tax conformity with worldwide taxation), it appears that book-tax conformity with territorial taxation would increase aggregate after-tax GAAP income, relative to the current system. Specifically, after-tax GAAP income increases from an average aggregate of approximately \$176.8 billion per year under the current system to approximately \$213.8 billion under a revenue-neutral book-tax conformity system with territorial taxation. Whether with territorial or worldwide taxation, the reduction in deferred taxes from book-tax conformity on average increases after-tax GAAP income.

Table 5 Panels A and B are the analogs to Table 3 Panels A and B, except that Table 5 employs territorial taxation. Table 5 Panel A reveals that when effective tax rates are computed at the industry level and including firms with negative income the average effective tax rate of the sample is 41.5%. Moving to a revenue-neutral application of book-tax conformity on a territorial basis would decrease the average industry ETR to an estimated 29.2%. When the same analysis is done in Panel B including only firms with positive income, the non-conformed effective tax rate averages 32.1% and this declines to an estimated 28.5% under conformity with territorial taxation. These estimates are based on GAAP earnings and allow no book-tax differences. However, for a variety of reasons, Congress may feel it necessary to retain some book-tax differences, which we discuss in the following section.

4.6 ALLOWING SOME BOOK-TAX DIFFERENCES

In Table 6 we present the same data as in Table 2 except that under this secondary simulation we assume that some book-tax differences are placed into the ‘conformed’ system. First, to provide for one likely book-tax difference that would be put back into the tax system is the non-deductibility (non-taxability) of Special Items (data #17). These items are generally accrual items and are often expenses such as restructuring charges, inventory write-downs if considered non-recurring, goodwill write-downs (impairments), or other non-recurring items. Many of these Special Items constitute book-tax differences under the current non-conformed system because they are either permanent book-tax difference such as goodwill impairments or are a current year estimate of a future cash expense (a temporary book-tax difference). We treat all special items as a permanent book-tax difference for purposes of our simulation.

The second adjustment we make in Table 6 is that we subtract the line item “Equity earnings in affiliates” (data item # 55) as discussed above.³⁹ There are other book-tax differences that could be added (and if the system were adopted would surely be lobbied for) but we stop here just to provide a relatively simple illustration of how the outcome could change if book-tax differences start to be re-introduced into the system. Using the same methods as described above with the addition of these adjustments, Table 6 estimates that the rate necessary to make U.S. tax collections

³⁹ We also considered adding back depreciation, amortization and depletion expense and allowing firms an immediate write off of capital expenditures. Our thought here was that in a strict book-tax conformity system where under GAAP purchase accounting is the rule for acquisitions, the way we are conducting our analyses above (and below) essentially gives the purchasers a step up in asset bases because book values are stepped up to purchase price (market value) as of the date of acquisition for financial accounting. However, under such a system the sellers and target corporation would have to pay taxes on the gains implied by the step-up, which would result in additional taxes that we are currently unable to estimate. The problem using our data is that 1) pooling was allowed through July of 2001 and thus there is no step up in the accounting data for those transactions, 2) we do not have the data to make a transitional adjustment, meaning we have no way to give the acquirers a depreciation deduction for the remaining bases of the assets (if a taxable acquisition which we cannot determine either) at the time of the rule change, and 3) we do not know the portion of U.S. versus foreign assets and depreciation expense following the 1997 change in the reporting of segment data.

revenue neutral under the book and tax conformed system would be 23.2%, which again is reasonable because the base would be even broader in this setting allowing for a lower rate.⁴⁰

5. *OTHER COUNTRIES' EXPERIENCES WITH BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY*

There is a wide range of the degree to which book and taxable incomes are conformed when one looks around the globe. In addition, there seem to be both movements to and from the conformed type system. We are not aware of any country that has a system where there is perfect book-tax conformity – every country seems to make at least some adjustments. Below we discuss briefly the status and current movements in several other countries and the EU as a whole.

Germany is a country that historically has had a close linkage between financial and tax accounting. The income tax law refers to the profit and loss computed under “sound accounting practice.” In addition, it is compulsory that the specific items shown in the balance sheet for the respective fiscal year have to be recognized for tax purposes and elections laid down in the accounting rules have to be exercised uniformly both for commercial and tax purposes (similar to the LIFO conformity rule in the U.S.). This type of dependence has been criticized by both German and international commentators as a major distortion of the information value of financial accounts (Schon, 2005).⁴¹ However, the linkage reduced compliance costs and extended conservative accounting to the tax system (which tends to understate corporate profits) so the business community was happy with the linked system (Schon, 2005).

In recent years however there has been a move away from book-tax conformity in Germany. The number of adjustments has increased since the late 1990s because the conservatism principle

⁴⁰ Again, this simulation assumes no behavioral responses.

⁴¹ Indeed, the German financial analyst society, Deutsche Vereinigung für Finanzanalyse und Anlageberatung (DVFA), developed a system in which analysts (and often companies) prepared adjusted earnings data for German companies based on information in the financial statements and company internal records in an effort to determine (permanent earnings) (Harris et al. (1994).

was sometimes in conflict with tax principles like the ability to pay doctrine. The desire to move away from conformity has increased following the introduction of the IFRS because of the information purposes of accounting standards, the private character of the IASB, and the fact that the IFRS will only apply to public companies (Schon, 2005). This movement from conformity has recently been evaluated in other countries as well including Austria, Belgium, and France. Indeed, in Spain, which adopted book-tax conformity in 1996, there have been recent studies opting for the separation of book and tax if IFRS becomes the basis of financial accounting (Schon, 2005).

The U.K. has historically been a country where tax and book incomes were very separate. However, Britain has begun to consider conformity as a way to get at the “truth” about corporate income. Over time the courts have relied on British GAAP as a cornerstone of tax accounting and the British Parliament in the 1998 U.K Finance Act provided explicitly that profit and loss measurement under tax law should follow the “true and fair view principle” in accordance with financial accounting standards if the tax code does not say otherwise (Schon, 2005). In 2003 the government published a document on “Reform of Corporate Tax,” which asked the public to comment on a closer alignment of book and tax. In 2004, the British Parliament enacted a provision that refers the measurement of business profits under U.K. income tax law to the new established IFRS. One major concern in Britain is the extent to which assets should be marked to market.

The EU has proposed a common consolidated tax base for multinational companies operating within the EU and early proposals were based on IFRS. That the base is consolidated is important to the EC because it would like to eliminate intercompany transactions in addition to establishing a single set of rules for a multinational group. The EU also argues that a common consolidated base is a way of eliminating transfer pricing problems in the EU while avoiding double

taxation and discrimination. The common consolidated base would permit cross border use of losses and cross border consolidation.

There are at least two recent studies using computer simulations that investigate the effects of book-tax conformity using a common consolidated tax base (IAS/IFRS) in the European Union. Both studies base their simulations on a program known as the European Tax Analyzer, which simulates the development of a hypothetical company over a period of ten years, incorporating variables to reflect production, investment, financing, etc. Jacobs et al. (2005) examines the consequences of IAS/IFRS-based tax accounting on the effective tax burdens of companies in 13 countries (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, and the USA). The study uses certain provisions of IAS/IFRS as a starting point for a common base. They analyze the resulting effective company tax burdens and find that relative to the current tax burdens 1) an exclusive harmonization of the tax base by introducing IAS/IFRS will not significantly reduce the current EU-wide differences of effective company tax burdens, and 2) with no tax rate changes the effective burdens in all countries increase (except for Ireland) because of base broadening. They conclude by asserting that using the common broader base would provide an opportunity to cut rates, which would tend to increase the attractiveness of member states as a location for companies and would also reduce dispersions of effective tax burdens across countries. Haverals (2005) conducts a similar study in Belgium and finds that the impact of an IAS/IFRS-based tax accounting on the effective tax burden of Belgian companies is large and not uniform across sectors. The conclusions from the study are similar to those from Jacobs et al. (2005).

On May 4, 2006, the Commission of the European Communities reported its progress on deliberating these issues to the EU and reported that they had decided that the IAS/IFRS should

only be used as a tool in designing the tax base but that there would be no formal link to standards. The group felt that some provisions of the IAS/IFRS would not be appropriate for taxation and problems would arise because not all companies are required to use IAS/IFRS and because these standards are constantly changing (Commission of the European Communities, 2006).

6. CONCLUSIONS

While book-tax conformity has many pros and cons, the international implications of book-tax conformity are largely unexplored. We describe several possible approaches to implementing book-tax conformity for firms that have both domestic and foreign operations. These approaches include: 1) book-tax conformity while retaining worldwide taxation but with no deferral of foreign income, 2) book-tax conformity while retaining both worldwide taxation and deferral of foreign income, 3) book-tax conformity along with territorial taxation, and 4) book-tax conformity with formulary apportionment. We discuss issues with implementing each system and conjecture at the behavioral responses to each.

Using financial statement data for the publicly traded U.S. firms, we simulate the tax consequences of book-tax conformity for two of the approaches: book-tax conformity with worldwide taxation and no deferral and book-tax conformity with territorial taxation. Specifically, we simulate the effects of book-tax conformity on the mean and variance of tax payments / collections and book earnings. Our simulations indicate that under book-tax conformity the tax base would be broadened, resulting in revenue neutral corporate tax rate that is lower than the current statutory rate. These simulations are necessarily imperfect as the data upon which they are built have many limitations.

The process of thinking through the implementation of book-tax conformity and simulating its effects reveals many of the complications that would arise if it were to be implemented, such as

how to avoid double-taxing the income of entities that are accounted for under the equity method and whether to allow non-taxable acquisitions or strictly apply purchase accounting to the taxation of mergers and acquisitions. Of course, the current non-conformed system of taxation is not without complications as well.

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Figure 1
U.S. Tax Treatment of Foreign Earnings and Effects on the Financial Statements

Type of Foreign Earnings	When Included in Book Income	When Included in U.S. Taxable Income	<u>Effect on Financial Statements</u>	
			U.S. Deferred Tax Accounts⁴²	Tax Rate Reconciliation⁴³
Currently earned and currently repatriated⁴⁴	When earned (i.e., current year).	When repatriated (i.e., current year).	The repatriation has no direct effect on deferred taxes because earned and repatriated in the same year. May be a deferred tax asset if firm has a foreign tax credit carryforward.	If foreign tax rate is higher than U.S. tax rate, there will be an entry for differential rate. If foreign rate is lower than U.S. rate, firm is in excess limitation position but there would be no entry in the rate reconciliation.
Currently earned and temporarily reinvested	When earned (i.e., current year).	When repatriated (not until a future year).	A deferred tax liability will be recorded for the amount of earnings temporarily reinvested times the tax rate. A deferred tax asset is recorded for the tax credits the firm expects at the date of repatriation.	If foreign tax rate is higher or lower than U.S. tax rate, there will be an entry for differential rate.
Currently earned and permanently reinvested	When earned (i.e., current year).	When repatriated (not until a future year).	When earnings are designated as permanently reinvested, no deferred tax liability is recorded on those earnings under APB 23 Indefinite Deferral.	If foreign tax rate is higher or lower than U.S. tax rate, there will be an entry for differential rate.

⁴² We denote here U.S. deferred tax accounts because for each of these there could also (and would likely) be foreign deferred tax accounts to account for the difference between book and taxable incomes in the foreign country.

⁴³ Foreign tax rate discussion ignores cross-crediting possibilities.

⁴⁴ This would also include foreign earnings subject to current taxation in the U.S. by virtue of Subpart F.

Table 1
Sample Selection

Criteria	Firms	Firm-years
-- Compustat from 1995-2004 with Assets > 0, US Incorporated, SIC code other than 6000s and stock ownership code not equal to 1	11,209	73,890
-- Firms with ADR, LP, or TRUST in the company name or a cusip ending in 'Z' or 'Y'	(342)	(1,916)
-- Firms missing world-wide, federal or foreign pre-tax income, current tax expense, or deferred tax expense	(682)	(16,174)
-- Firm-years not part of the firm's longest consecutive annual data run	-	(2,323)
TOTAL SAMPLE	10,185	53,477

Notes: Before eliminating firms because of missing tax data items, we assume that the sum of the federal and foreign components of pre-tax book income and of current tax expense equals the world-wide component. If any one of the three components is missing, it is computed from the other two. If no delineation between U.S. and foreign is given we assume all is U.S. sourced.

Table 2
Simulation of Book-Tax Conformity with No Deferral of Foreign Earnings
Current Tax Expense from Compustat used as the Estimate of U.S. Tax Collections

YEAR	PTBI	CURRENT TAX EXPENSE			tCONFORM	NET INCOME		
		NON-CONFORM	CONFORM-RETAIN 35% RATE	CONFORM-REVENUE NEUTRAL		NON-CONFORM	CONFORM-RETAIN 35% RATE	CONFORM-REVENUE NEUTRAL
1995	282,141	66,530	87,818	63,481	0.262	183,170	177,557	198,612
1996	328,894	76,913	99,177	72,189	0.262	211,969	205,956	230,151
1997	345,608	88,182	106,465	77,702	0.262	218,589	218,503	243,476
1998	306,360	85,346	108,149	79,432	0.262	186,861	194,942	216,945
1999	397,401	98,555	130,572	95,498	0.262	242,368	251,929	281,610
2000	329,983	101,237	131,358	94,852	0.262	175,598	207,471	231,341
2001	34,227	71,109	92,348	66,202	0.262	- 60,624	13,148	11,816
2002	115,996	53,807	100,508	71,903	0.262	7,072	66,772	73,204
2003	399,588	66,300	118,541	84,467	0.262	278,706	253,003	284,370
2004	479,854	92,221	134,879	94,542	0.262	324,186	311,514	348,127
ALL	3,020,052	800,200	1,109,815	800,269	0.262	1,767,896	1,900,795	2,119,652
MEAN	302,005	80,020	110,982	80,027		176,790	190,080	211,965
STDEV	133,491	15,578	16,959	11,961		117,715	88,558	99,916

Notes: YEAR is the Compustat fiscal year variable YEARA. PTBI is Compustat data #170, aggregated across all firms in the year. CURRENT TAX EXPENSE NON-CONFORM is the sum of current federal tax expense as reported under the current non-conformed system for all firms in the year. CURRENT TAX EXPENSE CONFORM (RETAIN 35% RATE) REVENUE NEUTRAL is the simulated current tax expense, assuming rate is equal to (35%) tCONFORM. tCONFORM is the tax rate necessary to achieve revenue neutrality over the aggregate 10 year period, assuming the U.S. tax collections from the sample are equivalent to aggregated Compustat current federal tax expense. NET INCOME NON-CONFORM is pre-tax book income from Compustat less current and deferred taxes from both federal and foreign jurisdictions (data #170 – data #63 – data #64 – data #269 – data #270). NET INCOME CONFORM (RETAIN 35%) REVENUE NEUTRAL is pre-tax book income from Compustat (data #170) less CURRENT TAX EXPENSE CONFORM (RETAIN 35%) REVENUE NEUTRAL, less deferred U.S. taxes due to NOLs or FTCs and less total foreign tax expense (data #64 + data#270).

Table 3 - Panel A
Simulation of Book-Tax Conformity with No Deferral of Foreign Earnings
Computation of Industry Current and Total ETRs
All Firms

INDUSTRY	NFIRMS	CURRENT ETR					TOTAL ETR				
		NON- CONFORM	CONFORM- RETAIN 35% RATE	DIFF	CONFORM- REVENUE NEUTRAL	DIFF	NON- CONFORM	CONFORM- RETAIN 35% RATE	DIFF	CONFORM- REVENUE NEUTRAL	DIFF
Not assigned	241	0.198	0.368	0.170	0.286	0.088	0.243	0.340	0.097	0.261	0.018
Mining/Construction	223	0.375	0.392	0.017	0.303	-0.072	0.358	0.351	-0.007	0.270	-0.089
Food	238	0.303	0.365	0.062	0.290	-0.013	0.329	0.366	0.037	0.292	-0.037
Textiles/Print/Publish	462	0.358	0.415	0.057	0.323	-0.035	0.382	0.365	-0.017	0.286	-0.096
Chemicals	240	0.320	0.402	0.083	0.329	0.009	0.323	0.369	0.046	0.302	-0.021
Pharmaceuticals	640	0.378	0.436	0.059	0.337	-0.041	0.342	0.345	0.003	0.265	-0.077
Extractive	416	0.307	0.423	0.116	0.367	0.060	0.347	0.412	0.065	0.360	0.013
Manf:Rubber/glass/etc	204	0.409	0.490	0.081	0.402	-0.007	0.403	0.393	-0.010	0.330	-0.073
Manf:Metal	268	0.358	0.468	0.110	0.367	0.010	0.393	0.380	-0.013	0.305	-0.088
Manf:Machinery	333	0.327	0.405	0.078	0.327	0.000	0.336	0.369	0.033	0.299	-0.037
Manf:ElectricalEqpt	473	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Manf:TransportEqpt	192	0.243	0.407	0.164	0.334	0.092	0.273	0.364	0.091	0.295	0.022
Manf:Instruments	699	0.341	0.436	0.095	0.343	0.002	0.354	0.363	0.009	0.288	-0.066
Manf:Misc.	135	0.359	0.422	0.063	0.326	-0.033	0.341	0.351	0.010	0.271	-0.071
Computers	1,968	0.553	0.648	0.095	0.518	-0.034	0.548	0.388	-0.161	0.324	-0.224
Transportation	697	0.533	0.852	0.319	0.647	0.114	0.657	0.367	-0.290	0.283	-0.374
Utilities	196	0.351	0.426	0.075	0.325	-0.026	0.389	0.365	-0.025	0.280	-0.109
Retail:Wholesale	445	0.351	0.420	0.069	0.325	-0.026	0.374	0.369	-0.005	0.288	-0.086
Retail:Misc.	592	0.384	0.408	0.023	0.308	-0.076	0.403	0.353	-0.050	0.267	-0.136
Retail:Restaurant	196	0.337	0.383	0.046	0.298	-0.038	0.333	0.356	0.023	0.277	-0.056
Services	1,327	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
All Firms	10,185	0.391	0.494	0.103	0.391	0.000	0.415	0.371	-0.044	0.298	0.116

Notes: Current ETR NON-CONFORM is sum of current federal and foreign tax expense (data#63 + data#64) divided by the sum of pre-tax book income (data #170), where the sums are within industry and across years. The numerator and denominator are summed separately before executing the division. CURRENT ETR CONFORM is the sum of (CURRENT TAX EXPENSE CONFORM (from Table 2) plus foreign current tax expense (data #64) divided by the sum of pre-tax book income. TOTAL ETR NON-CONFORM is the sum of foreign and federal current and deferred income tax expense (data#63 + data#64 + data#269 + data#270) divided by the sum of pre-tax book income (data #170). TOTAL ETR CONFORM is the sum of CURRENT TAX EXPENSE CONFORM (from Table 2) plus deferred U.S. taxes related to NOLs or FTCs plus total foreign tax expense (data#64+data270) divided by pre-tax book income. Two industries are reported as N/A due to severe small denominator problems as a result of large losses in those industries.

Table 3 – Panel B
Simulation of Book-Tax Conformity with No Deferral of Foreign Earnings
Computation of Industry Current and Total ETRs
Firms with Positive Aggregate Pre-Tax Earnings Only

INDUSTRY	NFIRMS	CURRENT ETR					TOTAL ETR				
		NON-CONFORM	CONFORM-RETAIN 35%	DIFF	CONFORM-REVENUE NEUTRAL	DIFF	NON-CONFORM	CONFORM-RETAIN 35%	DIFF	CONFORM-REVENUE NEUTRAL	DIFF
			RATE					RATE			
Not assigned	42	0.191	0.354	0.163	0.275	0.084	0.234	0.339	0.105	0.260	0.026
Mining/Construction	113	0.347	0.358	0.011	0.276	-0.070	0.335	0.351	0.015	0.269	-0.067
Food	146	0.293	0.360	0.067	0.286	-0.007	0.323	0.366	0.044	0.292	-0.031
Textiles/Print/Publish	289	0.320	0.371	0.051	0.289	-0.031	0.349	0.363	0.014	0.282	-0.066
Chemicals	126	0.302	0.377	0.075	0.308	0.005	0.307	0.365	0.058	0.297	-0.010
Pharmaceuticals	105	0.307	0.356	0.049	0.275	-0.032	0.279	0.346	0.067	0.265	-0.014
Extractive	213	0.293	0.399	0.106	0.347	0.054	0.338	0.411	0.073	0.358	0.020
Manf:Rubber/glass/etc	131	0.338	0.400	0.062	0.327	-0.012	0.358	0.381	0.023	0.313	-0.045
Manf:Metal	181	0.281	0.369	0.087	0.289	0.008	0.314	0.372	0.058	0.294	-0.020
Manf:Machinery	186	0.301	0.374	0.072	0.301	0.000	0.310	0.366	0.056	0.295	-0.015
Manf:ElectricalEqpt	200	0.390	0.444	0.054	0.358	-0.031	0.397	0.391	-0.006	0.318	-0.079
Manf:TransportEqpt	126	0.237	0.398	0.161	0.326	0.090	0.266	0.362	0.096	0.292	0.026
Manf:Instruments	300	0.289	0.369	0.079	0.290	0.001	0.303	0.360	0.057	0.283	-0.020
Manf:Misc.	58	0.316	0.365	0.049	0.282	-0.034	0.303	0.349	0.046	0.268	-0.035
Computers	577	0.325	0.376	0.052	0.300	-0.024	0.322	0.368	0.046	0.295	-0.028
Transportation	280	0.258	0.382	0.124	0.290	0.032	0.333	0.358	0.025	0.272	-0.061
Utilities	122	0.317	0.374	0.057	0.286	-0.031	0.355	0.361	0.007	0.277	-0.078
Retail:Wholesale	260	0.308	0.368	0.059	0.285	-0.024	0.332	0.366	0.034	0.284	-0.048
Retail:Misc.	329	0.334	0.351	0.017	0.265	-0.069	0.359	0.352	-0.007	0.266	-0.093
Retail:Restaurant	96	0.316	0.360	0.044	0.280	-0.036	0.314	0.356	0.042	0.276	-0.038
Services	601	0.322	0.371	0.049	0.288	-0.033	0.369	0.363	-0.005	0.282	-0.086
All Firms	4,481	0.298	0.373	0.075	0.295	-0.003	0.321	0.364	0.044	0.288	0.033

Notes: All variables are defined in Table 3 – Panel A. This panel only uses firms whose aggregate pre-tax book income over the 10 year period is greater than zero.

Table 4
Simulation of Book-Tax Conformity with the Simultaneous Implementation of Territorial Taxation
Current Tax Expense from Compustat used as the Estimate of U.S. Tax Collections

YEAR	CURRENT TAX EXPENSE						NET INCOME		
	PTBI	US-PTBI	NON- CONFORM	CONFORM- RETAIN 35% RATE	CONFORM- REVENUE NEUTRAL	tCONFORM	NON- CONFORM	CONFORM- RETAIN 35% RATE	CONFORM- REVENUE NEUTRAL
1995	282,141	197,148	66,530	82,999	65,036	0.274	183,170	183,521	198,455
1996	328,894	234,645	76,913	95,100	74,518	0.274	211,969	211,870	229,644
1997	345,608	244,746	88,182	101,677	79,671	0.274	218,589	224,212	242,752
1998	306,360	205,684	85,346	99,345	77,844	0.274	186,861	204,543	220,124
1999	397,401	284,494	98,555	122,946	96,337	0.274	242,368	261,566	283,116
2000	329,983	204,886	101,237	121,154	94,933	0.274	175,598	216,625	232,145
2001	34,227	57,527	71,109	84,694	66,364	0.274	60,624	16,963	12,605
2002	115,996	5,820	53,807	91,457	71,663	0.274	7,072	76,991	77,432
2003	399,588	262,117	66,300	105,845	82,937	0.274	278,706	269,091	288,946
2004	479,854	287,353	92,221	116,004	90,898	0.274	324,186	330,557	352,324
ALL	3,020,052	1,869,365	800,200	1,021,221	800,200	0.274	1,767,896	1,995,937	2,137,541
MEAN	302,005	186,937	80,020	102,122	80,020		176,790	199,594	213,754
STDEV	133,491	117,480	15,578	14,309	11,212		117,715	91,613	100,232

Notes: YEAR is the Compustat fiscal year variable YEARA. PTBI is Compustat data #170, aggregated across all firms in the year. CURRENT TAX EXPENSE NON-CONFORM is the sum of current federal tax expense for all firms in the year. CURRENT TAX EXPENSE CONFORM (RETAIN 35%) REVEUNE NEUTRAL is the simulated current tax expense, assuming the rate is equal to (35%) tCONFORM. tCONFORM is the tax rate necessary to achieve revenue neutrality over the aggregate 10 year period, assuming the U.S. tax collections from the sample are equivalent to aggregated Compustat current federal tax expense. NET INCOME NON-CONFORM is pre-tax book income from Compustat less current and deferred taxes from both federal and foreign jurisdictions (data #170 – data #63 – data #64 – data #269 – data #270). NET INCOME CONFORM (RETAIN 35% RATE) REVENUE NEUTRAL is pre-tax book income from Compustat (data #170) less CURRENT TAX EXPENSE CONFORM (RETAIN 35% RATE) REVENUE NEUTRAL less deferred U.S. tax related to NOLs less total foreign tax expense (data #64 + data#270).

Table 5 - Panel A
Simulation of Book-Tax Conformity with the Simultaneous Implementation of Territorial Taxation
Computation of Industry Current and Total ETRs
All Firms

INDUSTRY	NFIRMS	CURRENT ETR					TOTAL ETR				
		NON-CONFORM	CONFORM-RETAIN 35% RATE	DIFF	CONFORM-REVENUE NEUTRAL	DIFF	NON-CONFORM	CONFORM-RETAIN 35% RATE	DIFF	CONFORM-REVENUE NEUTRAL	DIFF
Not assigned	241	0.198	0.325	0.127	0.274	0.076	0.243	0.296	0.054	0.248	0.006
Mining/Construction	223	0.375	0.390	0.015	0.314	-0.061	0.358	0.342	-0.016	0.275	-0.083
Food	238	0.303	0.341	0.037	0.291	-0.012	0.329	0.341	0.012	0.293	-0.036
Textiles/Print/Publish	462	0.358	0.407	0.049	0.333	-0.025	0.382	0.353	-0.029	0.290	-0.092
Chemicals	240	0.320	0.376	0.056	0.329	0.009	0.323	0.336	0.013	0.296	-0.027
Pharmaceuticals	640	0.378	0.367	-0.011	0.317	-0.061	0.342	0.270	-0.072	0.239	-0.103
Extractive	416	0.307	0.409	0.102	0.367	0.060	0.347	0.395	0.048	0.357	0.010
Manf:Rubber/glass/etc	204	0.409	0.472	0.062	0.410	0.001	0.403	0.355	-0.048	0.318	-0.085
Manf:Metal	268	0.358	0.435	0.077	0.372	0.014	0.393	0.329	-0.064	0.292	-0.101
Manf:Machinery	333	0.327	0.380	0.053	0.327	-0.000	0.336	0.341	0.005	0.295	-0.041
Manf:ElectricalEqpt	473	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Manf:TransportEqpt	192	0.243	0.375	0.132	0.325	0.082	0.273	0.326	0.052	0.280	0.007
Manf:Instruments	699	0.341	0.394	0.053	0.337	-0.004	0.354	0.316	-0.038	0.275	-0.079
Manf:Misc.	135	0.359	0.370	0.010	0.318	-0.042	0.341	0.288	-0.053	0.252	-0.089
Computers	1,968	0.553	0.583	0.030	0.499	-0.053	0.548	0.319	-0.230	0.293	-0.255
Transportation	697	0.533	0.849	0.315	0.674	0.141	0.657	0.400	-0.257	0.322	-0.335
Utilities	196	0.351	0.427	0.076	0.340	-0.011	0.389	0.371	-0.019	0.296	-0.093
Retail:Wholesale	445	0.351	0.400	0.049	0.326	-0.026	0.374	0.344	-0.030	0.283	-0.091
Retail:Misc.	592	0.384	0.406	0.022	0.322	-0.063	0.403	0.349	-0.054	0.277	-0.125
Retail:Restaurant	196	0.337	0.365	0.028	0.308	-0.028	0.333	0.337	0.003	0.285	-0.048
Services	1,327	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
All Firms	10,185	0.391	0.464	0.073	0.391	0.000	0.415	0.339	-0.076	0.292	0.122

Notes: Current ETR NON-CONFORM is sum of current federal and foreign tax expense (data#63 + data#64) divided by the sum of pre-tax book income (data #170), where the sums are within industry and across years. The numerator and denominator are summed separately before executing the division. CURRENT ETR CONFORM (RETAIN 35% RATE) REVENUE NEUTRAL is the sum of (CURRENT TAX EXPENSE CONFORM (RETAIN 35% RATE) REVENUE NEUTRAL (from Table 4) plus foreign current tax expense (data #64) divided by the sum of pre-tax book income. TOTAL ETR NON-CONFORM is the sum of foreign and federal current and deferred income tax expense (data#63 + data#64 + data#269 + data#270) divided by the sum of pre-tax book income (data #170). TOTAL ETR CONFORM is the sum of CURRENT TAX EXPENSE CONFORM (RETAIN 35% RATE) REVENUE NEUTRAL (from Table 4) plus deferred U.S. tax related to NOLs plus total foreign tax expense (data#64+data270) divided by pre-tax book income. Two industries are reported as N/A due to severe small denominator problems as a result of large losses in those industries.

Table 5 – Panel B
Simulation of Book-Tax Conformity with the Simultaneous Implementation of Territorial Taxation
Computation of Industry Current and Total ETRs
Firms with Positive Aggregate Pre-Tax Earnings Only

INDUSTRY	NFIRMS	CURRENT ETR					TOTAL ETR				
		NON- CONFORM	CONFORM- RETAIN 35% RATE	DIFF	CONFORM- REVENUE NEUTRAL	DIFF	NON- CONFORM	CONFORM- RETAIN 35% RATE	DIFF	CONFORM- REVENUE NEUTRAL	DIFF
Not assigned	42	0.191	0.312	0.121	0.263	0.072	0.234	0.297	0.063	0.248	0.014
Mining/Construction	113	0.347	0.356	0.010	0.287	-0.060	0.335	0.342	0.007	0.274	-0.061
Food	146	0.293	0.336	0.042	0.287	-0.006	0.323	0.341	0.018	0.292	-0.030
Textiles/Print/Publish	289	0.320	0.364	0.044	0.297	-0.023	0.349	0.352	0.004	0.288	-0.061
Chemicals	126	0.302	0.352	0.050	0.308	0.005	0.307	0.334	0.027	0.292	-0.015
Pharmaceuticals	105	0.307	0.299	-0.008	0.258	-0.048	0.279	0.284	0.005	0.245	-0.034
Extractive	213	0.293	0.386	0.093	0.347	0.054	0.338	0.393	0.055	0.354	0.016
Manf:Rubber/glass/etc	131	0.338	0.384	0.046	0.333	-0.006	0.358	0.349	-0.010	0.305	-0.054
Manf:Metal	181	0.281	0.342	0.060	0.292	0.011	0.314	0.332	0.017	0.287	-0.027
Manf:Machinery	186	0.301	0.351	0.049	0.301	-0.000	0.310	0.339	0.029	0.291	-0.019
Manf:ElectricalEqpt	200	0.390	0.420	0.030	0.362	-0.028	0.397	0.330	-0.067	0.290	-0.107
Manf:TransportEqpt	126	0.237	0.366	0.129	0.317	0.080	0.266	0.323	0.057	0.277	0.011
Manf:Instruments	300	0.289	0.333	0.044	0.285	-0.005	0.303	0.320	0.017	0.273	-0.030
Manf:Misc.	58	0.316	0.319	0.003	0.274	-0.042	0.303	0.295	-0.008	0.254	-0.050
Computers	577	0.325	0.337	0.013	0.289	-0.036	0.322	0.319	-0.003	0.274	-0.048
Transportation	280	0.258	0.380	0.122	0.302	0.044	0.333	0.370	0.037	0.294	-0.040
Utilities	122	0.317	0.376	0.059	0.299	-0.017	0.355	0.366	0.012	0.292	-0.063
Retail:Wholesale	260	0.308	0.351	0.042	0.285	-0.023	0.332	0.343	0.011	0.280	-0.052
Retail:Misc.	329	0.334	0.349	0.015	0.276	-0.057	0.359	0.349	-0.010	0.276	-0.083
Retail:Restaurant	96	0.316	0.343	0.027	0.289	-0.027	0.314	0.337	0.023	0.284	-0.030
Services	601	0.322	0.369	0.047	0.299	-0.022	0.369	0.358	-0.011	0.291	-0.078
All Firms	4,481	0.298	0.350	0.052	0.295	-0.003	0.321	0.338	0.017	0.285	0.036

Notes: All variables are defined in Table 5 – Panel A. This panel only uses firms whose aggregate pre-tax book income over the 10 year period is greater than zero.

Table 6
Simulation of Book-Tax Conformity with No Deferral of Foreign Earnings
Current Tax Expense from Compustat used as the Estimate of U.S. Tax Collections
Special Items and Equity Earnings in Affiliates Treated as Permanent Book-Tax Differences

YEAR	PTBI	CURRENT TAX EXPENSE				tCONFORM	NET INCOME		
		NON- CONFORM	CONFORM- RETAIN 35% RATE	CONFORM- REVENUE NEUTRAL	NON- CONFORM		CONFORM- RETAIN 35% RATE	CONFORM- REVENUE NEUTRAL	
1995	282,141	66,530	99,720	63,485	0.232	183,170	158,801	192,994	
1996	328,894	76,913	111,107	71,272	0.232	211,969	191,164	228,174	
1997	345,608	88,182	124,827	80,335	0.232	218,589	197,555	237,826	
1998	306,360	85,346	122,747	79,452	0.232	186,861	173,091	209,892	
1999	397,401	98,555	139,029	89,385	0.232	242,368	246,672	288,001	
2000	329,983	101,237	147,312	93,259	0.232	175,598	181,496	221,892	
2001	34,227	71,109	110,611	69,569	0.232	- 60,624	- 60,785	- 37,800	
2002	115,996	53,807	114,106	71,231	0.232	7,072	- 10,782	23,898	
2003	399,588	66,300	132,929	82,668	0.232	278,706	235,082	282,884	
2004	479,854	92,221	162,119	99,502	0.232	324,186	271,898	333,604	
ALL	3,020,052	800,200	1,264,506	800,159	0.232	1,767,896	1,584,190	1,981,364	
MEAN	302,005	80,020	126,451	80,016		176,790	158,419	198,136	
STDEV	133,491	15,578	19,082	11,481		117,715	108,819	116,829	

Notes: All variables are as defined in Table 2 except that the tax base is adjusted by subtracting special items (data#17) and adding equity earnings (data #55) to PTBI. In other words, in this table two permanent book-tax differences are introduced into the system.